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State Antitrust in the Federal Schemet
HERBERT HOVENKAMP*
INTRODUCTION
Before 1890, when the first federal antitrust statute was enacted,
restraints of trade were regulated largely by state law.' Neither the
United States Congress that enacted the Sherman Act2 nor subsequent
Congresses that enacted the other federal antitrust laws meant to change
the scope of state regulation. The legislative history of the federal antitrust
law indicates that Congress intended to leave state antitrust enforcement
more or less intact but to provide an additional federal forum for dealing
with restraints of trade which exceeded the jurisdiction of the courts of
any particular state.3
The result of this intention is that antitrust enforcement has
theoretically existed on two different levels, federal and state.4 However,
two things limited state participation. The first was the relatively awesome
power of federal antitrust law, which generally provided broad liability,
aided by a federal judicial system that was aggressive and enthusiastic
about antitrust enforcement. The second phenomenon was the perceived
t Copyright 1984 by Herbert Hovenkamp. The author authorizes photocopy reproduc-
tions of this work made for or used by any non-profit educational institution.
* B.A. 1969, Calvin Coll.; M.A. 1971; Ph.D. 1976; J.D. 1978, Univ. of Texas. Associate
Professor University of California, Hastings College of the Law.
I See Eaton, On Contracts in Restraint of Trade, 4 HARV. L. REv. 128 (1890); Jones,
Historical Development of the Law of Business Competition, 36 YALE L.J. 207 (1926); Letwin,
Congress and the Sherman Antitrust Law: 1887-1890, 23 U. CHL L. REv. 221 (1956); Limbaugh,
Historic Origins of Anti-Trust Legislation, 18 Mo. L. REv. 215 (1953).
2 Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. SS 1-7 (1890) (amended 1976).
3See R.E. Spriggs Co. v. Adolph Coors Co., 37 Cal. App. 3d 653, 600, 112 Cal. Rptr.
585, 589 (1974); J. FLYNN, FEDERALISM AND STATE ANTITRUST REGULATION 150 (1964); See
generally Rubin, Rethinking State Antitrust Enforcement, 26 FLORIDA L. REV. 653 (1974).
One must add the word "theoretically" because during substantial periods of American
history, state antitrust law languished, in some states to the point of near nonexistence.
See Project, Reviving State Antitrust Enforcement: the Problems with Putting New Wine
in Old Wine Skins, J. CORP. L. 547, 555 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Project
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jurisdictional limits of the state courts. At various times, many state courts
concluded that their jurisdiction was limited to activities that either were
not involved in interstate commerce or which had no effect on interstate
commerce.5 Many of those decisions-at least those based on perceived
limits imposed upon the states by federal law-are of dubious vitality
today.
For a half century after the Sherman Act's passage, courts and many
commentators adopted a rather facile distinction between the proper
jurisdictional limits of federal and state antitrust law. Federal law ap-
plied to restraints that were "in or affecting" interstate commerce. State
law, on the other hand, applied to purely "local" restraints. The limits
on state antitrust jurisdiction were not often questioned, since in most
cases it was to a plaintiff's advantage to plead his case under federal law
in a federal court.
Today, however, the constitutional and statutory limits on state anti-
trust enforcement are much less restrictive than in the past. Now no one
doubts that state courts can reach persons located outside the forum state,'
or that state legislatures have the authority to condemn certain acts that
take place outside the state.7 State antitrust law reaches many things
"in or affecting" interstate commerce.' The result is an immense overlap
between federal and state antitrust authority.
More importantly, the notion that federal antitrust law is aggressive
while state law is passive is largely a thing of the past. Since the early
I Paramount Public Corp. v. Hill, 11 F. Supp. 478 (W.D. Wis. 1932). But see Standard
Oil Co. v. Tennessee, 217 U.S. 413 (1910). State v. Fullerton Lumber Co., 35 S.D. 410, 152
N.W. 708 (1915); First Nat'l Bank v. Missouri Glass Co., 169 Mo. App. 374, 152 S.W. 378
(1912); Hadley Dean Plate Glass Co. v. Highland Glass Co., 143 F. 242 (8th Cir. 1906). See
generally Cooke, The Adequacy of Remedies Against Monopoly Under State Law, 19 YALE
L.J. 356 (1910); Note, The Commerce Clause and State Antitrust Regulation, 61 COLUM. L.
REV. 1469 (1961).
One should distinguish from the above cases those instances in which courts have held
and continue to hold that as a matter of state law some state antitrust statutes will not
reach activities in or affecting interstate commerce. See Denison Mattress Factory v. Spring-
Air Co., 308 F.2d 403 (5th Cir. 1962); Kosuga v. Kelly, 257 F.2d 48 (7th Cir. 1958), affjd
on other grounds, 358 U.S. 516 (1959); In re Wiring Device Antitrust Litigation, 498 F. Supp.
79 (E.D.N.Y. 1980); Three J Farms, Inc. v. Alton Box Bd. Co., 1979-1 Trade Cas. (CCH)
62,423 (D.S.C. 1978), rev'd on other grounds, 609 F.2d 112 (4th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445
U.S. 911 (1980); Sloan v. Miami Margarine Co., 247 S.W.2d 169 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952).
' See McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957); International Shoe Co.
v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945); St. Joe Paper v. Superior Court, 120 Cal. App. 3d 991,
175 Cal. Rptr. 94 (1981), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 982 (1982). Von Mebren, Adjudicatory Jurisdic-
tion: General Theories Compared and Evaluated, 63 B.U.L. REV. 279 (1983). McDougal,
Judicial Jurisdiction: From a Contacts to an Interest Analysis, 35 VAND. L. REV. 1 (1982);
Comment, Constitutional Limitations on State Long-Arm Jurisdiction, U. CHI. L. REV. 156
(1982).
1 See Aldens, Inc. v. LaFollette, 552 F.2d 745 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 880 (1977);
R.E. Spriggs Co. v. Adolph Coors Co., 37 Cal. App. 3d 653, 112 Cal. Rtpr. 585 (1974). See
generally Reese, Legislative Jurisdiction, 78 COLUM. L. REv. 1587 (1978).
' See R.E. Spriggs Co. v. Adolph Coors Co., 37 Cal. App. 3d 653, 112 Cal. Rptr. 585
(1974); Commonwealth v. McHugh, 326 Mass. 249, 265, 93 N.E.2d 751, 762 (1950); J. FLYNN,
supra note 3, at 71-72.
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1970's the United States Supreme Court has gradually restricted the scope
of federal antitrust liability and narrowed the range of private persons
who may sue for antitrust violations.' On the other hand, many states
have broadened the scope of their antitrust laws and have granted stand-
ing to a broader class of plaintiffs than have a cause of action under the
federal laws. As a result, activities that are not illegal under federal law
are condemned by the antitrust law of some states.10 Furthermore, some
persons who have suffered injury because of antitrust violations have a
damages action under various state antitrust laws while they have no
such action under the federal statutes.1
See, e.g., Brunswick v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477 (1977); Illinois Brick Co.
v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977).
" As a general matter, state antitrust laws are substantively similar to federal anti-
trust law, and many state courts have held that case law interpreting the federal statutes
is fully applicable to corresponding state statutes. See Rubin & Malet, State Initiatives in
Antitrust Investigation, 4 J. CORP. L. 513, 514 (1979); Project, supra note 4, at 617-20. Some
state statutes expressly provide that they shall be interpreted by federal standards; e.g.,
Mo. ANN. STAT. S 416.141 (Vernon, 1979); however, as a result either of statutory language
or judicial interpretation, some state antitrust laws are now broader than federal law. For
example, see MD. ANN. CODE, art. 56, § 157E (1977) which not only forbids any producer or
refiner of petroleum products from operating retail gasoline stations within the state, but
also requires wholesalers of petroleum products to "extend all voluntary allowances uniformly
to all retail service station dealers supplied" in the state. The statute appears to require
virtual wholesale price uniformity, and is therefore far more rigid than the price discrimina-
tion provisions of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. 5§ 12-27 (1974), as amended by the Robinson-
Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. 5 13 (1976). The constitutionality of the statute was upheld in Exxon
Corp. v. Governor of Md., 437 U.S. 121 (1978). See infra notes 64-70 and accompanying text.
Likewise, Shell Oil Co. v. Younger, 587 F.2d 34 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 947
(1979), held that the price discrimination provision of the California antitrust law, CAL.
Bus. & PROF. CODE 5 21200 (Deering 1975), is not preempted by federal law even though it
is broader and requires more price uniformity than the federal Robinson-Patman Act. W.
Inglis & Sons v. ITT Continental Baking Co., 668 F.2d 1014, 1048-49 (9th Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 103 S. Ct. 57-58 (1982), held that the California statute prohibiting predatory pricing,
CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE SS 17026, 17029, 17073 (Deering 1976), is not preempted by federal
law even though the California statute appears to condemn pricing below average total
cost, while most interpretations of federal law have held that pricing must be below average
variable cost in order to be presumptively illegal. See also G.H.I.I. v. MTS, Inc., 195 Cal.
Rptr. 211, 223 (Cal. App. 1983) (same). W.J. Seufert Land Co. v. National Restaurant Sup-
ply Co., 1973-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 74,643 at 94,819 (Ore. 1973), found a more stringent
test for mergers under Oregon law than exists under federal law. Three J Farms, Inc.
v. Alton Box Bd. Co., 1971-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 62,423 at 76,548 (D.S.C. 1978), rev'd on
other grounds, 609 F.2d 112 (4th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 911 (1980), noted that
under South Carolina law, a prevailing plaintiff can recover "a return of the full purchase
price" rather than three times the overcharge as permitted by federal law; see Ohio's an-
titrust statute, the Valentine Act, OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1331, 1331.12 (1980) providing
that no "statute of limitations shall prevent or be a bar to any suit or proceeding for any
violation of' the Act. The federal antitrust laws contain a four year statute of limitations.
15 U.S.C. § 15b (1976); see also Mendelovitz v. Coors Co., 693 F.2d 570, 578-79 (5th Cir.
1982), suggesting that the Texas antitrust statute does not contain a requirement of injury
to competition.
" For example, five states have responded to Illinois Brick by amending their own anti-
trust statutes to give a damages action to indirect purchasers. See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE
S 16750(a) (West Supp. 1980) (as amended by Act of Aug. 24, 1978, ch. 536, 1978 Cal. Stat.
1693); HAWAH REV. STAT. S 480-14(c) (Supp. 1980); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 60-7(2) (Smith-Hurd
1983]
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The result of these related phenomena is that people who at one time
would naturally have carried their antitrust complaints to federal court
now choose state court, even though the alleged illegal acts were clearly
in interstate commerce, or were committed outside the state whose law
is being applied.12
The new enthusiasm about state antitrust law places some difficult
burdens on the two-tier, federal-state, antitrust enforcement scheme. First,
state rules creating liability or giving rights of action can interfere with
the federal system of antitrust enforcement when state law is different
from federal. For example, indirect purchaser lawsuits under state law
can play havoc with federally created mechanisms for improving the effi-
ciency of private antitrust enforcement and damages allocation. Secondly,
certain applications of state antitrust laws can defeat the strong federal
interest in efficient and nonrepetitive litigation. Even state statutes iden-
tical in their coverage with federal law can be applied so as to subvert
federal interests in the efficient administratioii of justice. This article ex-
amines some of these growing tensions in the two-tier, federal-state, anti-
trust enforcement scheme.
CONGRESSIONAL INTENT AND STATE ANTITRUST
Two conclusions seem rather clear about the intent of the Fifty-First
Congress, which debated and passed the Sherman Act in 1890.13 First,
Congress envisioned a two-level enforcement scheme in which federal law
would supplement but not replace, state antitrust law. Second, the Fifty-
First Congress perceived the relationship between state and federal anti-
trust law so differently than we perceive it today, that issues of congres-
sional "intent" on this subject are virtually moot.
At no time in the extensive congressional debates on the Sherman Act
did any member of Congress suggest that the Sherman Act should pre-
empt all state antitrust law. On the contrary, the legislative history of
the Sherman Act is replete with statements that the Act was designed
to supplement rather than to abrogate existing state antitrust enforce-
Supp. 1981); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 57-1-3(A) (Supp. 1980); WIS. STAT. ANN. 5 133.18(1) (West Supp.
1980). Alabama and Mississippi permitted indirect purchaser damages actions even before
Illinois Brick was decided. ALA. CODE S 6-5-60(a) (1975); MIss. CODE ANN. § 75-21-9 (1973). See
generally Note, Indirect Purchaser Suits Under State Antitrust Laws: A Detour Around the
Illinois Brick Wall, 34 STAN. L. REV. 203 (1981).
12 See, e.g., St. Joe Paper Co. v. Superior Court, 120 Cal. App. 3d 991, 175 Cal. Rptr.
94 (1981), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 982 (1982) (holding that a price-fixing conspiracy created
and effected outside California could give rise to a damages action by indirect purchasers
in California under the state antitrust act). See generally Flynn, Trends in Federal Antitrust
Doctrine Suggesting Future Directions for State Antitrust Enforcement, 4 J. CORP. L. 479
(1979).
13 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1976).
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ment, but to leave that enforcement itself unaffected. Senator Sherman
argued that one purpose of the Sherman Act was
to supplement the enforcement of the established rules of the com-
mon and statute law by the courts of the several states in dealing
with combinations that affect injuriously the industrial liberty of the
citizens of these states. It is to arm the Federal courts within the
full limits of their constitutional power that they may co-operate with
the State courts in checking, curbing, and controlling the most
dangerous combinations that now threaten the business, property, and
trade of the people of the United States .... 14
In the same statement, however, Senator Sherman attempted to explain
why he believed federal supplementation of state antitrust was necessary:
"If the combination is confined to a state, the state should apply the
remedy; if it is interstate and controls any production in many states,
Congress must apply the remedy.'""5
The Senator's paradigm was simple: if a restraint on trade was located
entirely within a state, it was out of congressional reach. On the other
hand, if a combination or conspiracy was located in more than one state,
then the entire combination was beyond the jurisdictional power of the
state legislature and the state court.
Senator Sherman's perception of the relationship between state and
federal power was correct in 1890,16 but has lost its vitality today. Federal
antitrust law now easily reaches many restraints that are "confined" to
a state, provided that there is an effect on interstate commerce. 7 On the
other hand, state antitrust laws have been used repeatedly to reach
restraints that are located entirely or in part in a different state."i
The Limits of State Court Jurisdiction: 1890
When the Sherman Act was passed in 1890, the constitutional limit
of state judicial jurisdiction was governed by Pennoyer v. Neff,'9 in which
Justice Field concluded:
, 21 CONG. REC. 2456-57 (1890).
, 21 CONG. REc. 2457 (1890).
,6 See United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895); People v. North River Sugar
Ref. Co., 121 N.Y. 582, 24 N.E. 834 (1890).
" McLain v. Real Estate Bd. of New Orleans, Inc., 444 U.S. 232 (1980); Hospital Bldg.
Co. v. Trustees of Rex Hospital, 425 U.S. 738 (1976k Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. American
Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219 (1948).
11 See Rubin, supra note 3, at 671-74 (1974). See generally Note, The Commerce Clause
and State Antitrust Regulation, 61 COLUM. L. REV. 1469 (1961). See St. Joe Paper v. Superior
Court, 120 Cal. App. 3d 991, 175 Cal. Rptr. 94 (1981), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 982 (1982); Stan-
dard Oil Co. of Ky. v. Tennessee, 217 U.S. 413 (1910); Flood v. Kuhn, 443 F.2d 264, 267
(2d Cir. 1971), affd, 407 U.S. 258 (1972).
11 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
19831
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The authority of every tribunal is necessarily restricted by the ter-
ritorial limits of the State in which it is established. Any attempt to
exercise authority beyond those limits would be deemed in every other
forum, as has been said by this court, an illegitimate assumption of
power, and be "resisted as mere abuse."2
In fact, Pennoyer's doctrine of judicial jurisdiction was built on a
generalized concept of territoriality that somewhat intermixed more
modern notions of judicial and legislative jurisdiction. Justice Field
observed that there were "two well-established principles" governing the
jurisdictional power of a state:
One of these principles is, that every State possesses exclusive jurisdic-
tion and sovereignty over persons and property within its territory....
The other principle ... is, that no State can exercise direct jurisdic-
tion and authority over persons or property without its territory....
And so it is laid down by jurists, as an elementary principle, that
the laws of one State have no operation outside of its territory, ex-
cept so far as allowed by comity .... 1,
Not only were the state courts of the nineteenth century incapable of
asserting jurisdiction over persons outside the state, state legislatures
were generally thought to be incapable of proscribing conduct that oc-
curred outside the geographic borders of the state.' Senator Sherman
echoed this view of the law in 1890.
Although the question of extraterritorial application of state antitrust
laws did not often arise in the late nineteenth and early twentieth
o Id. at 720.
2 Id. For further analysis of views of state adjudicatory jurisdiction at this time, see
Hovenkamp, Federalism Revised (Book Review), 34 HASTINGS L.J. 201 (1982).
' See Chief Justice Taney's conclusion in Ableman v. Booth, 62 U.S. 506, 524 (1858):
"No judicial process, whatever form it may assume, can have any lawful authority outside
the limits of the jurisdiction of the court or judge by whom it is issued; and an attempt
to enforce it beyond these boundaries is nothing less than lawless violence." See, e.g., Allgeyer
v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897); In re Grice, 79 F. 627 (N.D. Tex. 1897), rev'd on other
grounds sub nom. Baker v. Grice, 169 U.S. 284 (1898) (Texas antitrust law condemning con-
duct occurring outside the state declared unconstitutional); Milliken v. Pratt, 125 Mass.
374 (1878). In the international context, see J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICT OF
LAWS 5 7, at 8 (7th ed. 1872). For a brief history of state legislative jurisdictional concepts
see G. STUMBERG. PRINCIPLES OF CONFLICT OF LAWS 54-68 (2d ed. 1951).
2 Senator Sherman said,
These modern combinations are uniformly composed of citizens and corpora-
tions of many States, and therefore they can only be dealt with by a jurisdic-
tion as broad as their combination. The State courts have held in many cases
that they cannot interfere in controlling the action of corporations of other
states. If corporations from other States do business within a State, the courts
may control their action within the limits of the State, but when a trust is
created by a combination of many corporations from many states, there are
no courts with jurisdiction broad enough to deal with them except the courts
of the United States.
21 CONG. REC. 2460 (1890).
[Vol. 58:375
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centuries,24 one can determine something about the extraterritorial limits
of antitrust law at that time by looking at the first case the Supreme
Court decided respecting the extraterritorial application of the Sherman
Act. In American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co.,' the defendant, a New
Jersey corporation, and certain aliens including the government of Costa
Rica were accused of conspiring to monopolize the market in bananas to
be shipped into the United States. All the allegedly illegal acts occurred
outside the United States.
Writing for a unanimous Court,2" Justice Holmes noted that the plain-
tiffs case depended on "several rather startling propositions," the first
of which was that acts committed outside the United States could be
governed by the Sherman Act: "[T]he general and almost universal rule
is that the character of an act as lawful or unlawful must be determined
wholly by the law of the country where the act is done."'2
Obviously, wrote Holmes, the broad language of the Sherman Act sug-
gesting that it be applied to "every contract in restraint of trade" or
2 The Federal District Court for the Northern District of Texas decided the issue squarely
against extraterritoriality in 1897, although the Supreme Court subsequently held that
the lower court did not have jurisdiction. In re Grice, 79 F. 627 (N.D. Tex. 1897), rev'd
on other grounds sub nom. Baker v. Grice, 169 U.S. 284 (1898). At issue was a Texas anti-
trust statute that provided, in part, that
Persons out of the state may commit and be liable to indictment and convic-
tion for committing any of the offenses enumerated in this act, which do not
in their commission, necessarily require a personal presence in this state, the
object being to reach and punish all persons offending against its provisions,
whether within or without the state.
Tex. Stat., March 30, 1889. In examining this part of the Texas statute, the federal judge
observed that
It has been properly suggested that, should this feature of this act be carried
out and administered, it would be unnecessary for any other state or the nation
at large to have any other laws upon the subject, as all persons within the
limits of the United States could be regulated in their dealings and in the
conduct of their business according to the wishes of the legislature of Texas.
... [Tihat part of the act which proposes this extraterritorial jurisdiction is
absolutely null and void.
79 F. at 639. The basis of the holding was the fourteenth amendment due process clause.
See also Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897), frequently cited for the proposition
that the due process clause gives a private citizen the right to contract for insurance as
he chooses; but more properly standing for the doctrine that a state has no right to declare
illegal an insurance contract made by one of its citizens in another state:
[The contract at issue] was a valid contract, made outside the State, to be
performed outside of the State, although the subject was property tempo-
rarily within the state. As the contract was valid in the place where made
and where it was to be performed, the party to the contract ... must have
the liberty [to enforce the contract] within the limits of the State, any prohibi-
tion of the state statute to the contrary notwithstanding.
165 U.S. at 592.
213 U.S. 347 (1909).
The elder Justice Harlan concurred.
American Banana, 213 U.S. at 355.
1983]
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"every person who shall monopolize" must be taken to mean "only
everyone subject to such legislation, not all that the legislator
subsequently may be able to catch."' In this particular case not only were
the acts complained of "not within the Sherman Act, but they were not
torts by the law of the place [where they were committed], and therefore
were not torts at all, however contrary to the ethical and economic
postulates" of the Sherman Act.2 9
The Limits of State Court Jurisdiction: 1988
Today, the notion of the extraterritorial limits of state adjudication
and legislation is much broader than it was eighty years ago. Interna-
tional Shoe v. Washington and its offspring' have considerably broadened
the power of state courts to reach persons located outside the state.2
Likewise, the question of legislative jurisdiction -the power of a state
to apply its law to a transaction or event outside the state -is determin-
ed by looking more to the interest of the state in applying its law and
less to the place where the event occurred.3 State courts frequently use
state antitrust laws to condemn activities occurring outside the state if
the violation has a sufficient effect within the state so that the state may
justifiably assert its own law.'
Federal Power to Legislate Under the Commerce Clause: 1890
One of the most hotly discussed issues in the congressional debates
over the Sherman Act was the power of Congress under the commerce
' Id. at 357.
" Id. See also Slater v. Mexican Nat'l Railroad, 194 U.S. 129 (1904) (state may not apply
its law with respect to a death that occurred in Mexico). But see Hammond Packing v.
Arkansas, 212 U.S. 322, 343 (1909) (state may revoke permission to do business within the
state given to corporation engaged in antitrust violations in other states).
326 U.S. 310 (1945).
3 See McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957); Perkins v. Benguet Consol.
Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952); see generally Kurland, The Supreme Court, The Due Process
Clause and the In Personam Jurisdiction of State Courts from Pennoyer to Denckla: A Review,
25 U. CHI. L. REV. 569 (1958).
See generally von Mehren, Adjudicatory Jurisdiction: General Theories Compared and
Evaluated, 63 B.U.L. REV. 279 (1983); Brilmayer, How Contacts Count, 1980 SuP. CT. REv. 77;
Redish, Due Process, Federalism, and Personal Jurisdiction: A Theoretical Evaluation, 75
Nw. U.L. REV. 1112 (1981).
"See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302 (1981); Korn, The Choice-Of-Law Revolu-
tion: A Critique, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 772 (1983); Martin, Constitutional Limitations on Choice
of Law, 61 CORNELL L. REV. 185 (1976); Reese, supra note 7. See generally Brilmayer, Legitimate
Interests in Multistate Problems: As Between State and Federal Law, 79 MIcE. L. REV. 1315
(1981). But see Ely, Choice of Law and the State's Interest in Protecting its Own, 23 WM.
& MARY L. REv. 173 (1981).
u See St. Joe Paper Co. v. Superior Court, 120 Cal. App. 3d 991, 175 Cal. Rptr. 94 (1981);
R.E. Spriggs Co. v. Adolph Coors Co., 37 Cal. App. 3d 653, 112 Cal. Rptr. 585 (1974).
[Vol. 58:375
STATE ANTITRUST
clause to regulate restraints or combinations in manufacturing industries.
Senator Sherman repeatedly defended his proposed statute from
challenges that manufacturing could not be regulated by Congress because
manufacturing is not "commerce" within the meaning of the commerce
clause. Those Senators and Congressmen who had the most restrictive
view of congressional power under the commerce clause believed that
Congress could not regulate "manufacturing" even if the manufactured
products were intended for interstate shipment.'5 Senator Sherman, who.
had an expansive notion of federal power, argued that his proposed legisla-
tion was constitutional because it did not apply to property or combina-
tions located entirely within a single state, but only to a trust or com-
bination that extended into two or more states or which involved
interstate transportation. 6
In the entire legislative history of the Sherman Act, Senator Sherman's
view of federal power under the commerce clause was the broadest: the
new federal statute would reach combinations whose members or assets
were located in more than one state, but not those entirely within a state.
This view, as it turned out, was more expansive than the Supreme Court
initially permitted. In United States v. E.C. Knight Company, 7 decided
only five years after the Sherman Act was passed, the Supreme Court
agreed with Senator George that manufacturing is not commerce, and,
thus the Sherman Act would not reach a manufacturing trust composed
of virtually all America's sugar refineries located in several states.3 8
The Sherman Act as contemplated by its framers worked in a clearly
articulated harmony with state antitrust laws. In the narrow view, subse-
quently confirmed by the Supreme Court in E.C. Knight, the Act applied
only to goods in the flow of commerce or to restraints on interstate
transportation itself.Y In the broad view espoused by Senator Sherman,
' For example, Senator James Z. George (D. Miss.), a former Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court of Mississippi, argued that
the power of Congress exists only over the subject [of interstate commerce],
so far as it comes from transportation, while the transportation is being carried
on; that the power of Congress does not begin as to the subject until transpor-
tation begins, and it ends when transportations is completed.... The regula-
tion must be of the act or the transaction of commerce itself.
20 CONG. REC. 1460 (1889).
And see Senator George's statements in 21 CONG. REC. 1769 (1890): "[W]hen the article
of commerce has begun to move-not begun to be produced with an intent to move-from
one State to another, then at that time interstate commerce in that commodity has com-
menced. Not before that time, but then, at the commencement of the interstate movement."
See Veazie v. Moor, 55 U.S. 568 (1852); Lord v. Goodall, Nelson & Perkins S.S. Co., 102
U.S. 541 (1881), upon which Senator George relied.
21 CONG. REC. 2462 (1890).
156 U.S. 1 (1895).
Id. at 12 ("Commerce succeeds to manufacture, and is not a part of it.").
The Supreme Court had no problem with subject matter jurisdiction two years later
in United States v. Trans-Mo. Freight Assoc., 166 U.S. 290 (1897), when the alleged com-
bination involved the market for interstate rail transportation.
19831
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the Act also reached combinations or conspiracies in restraint of trade
if those restraints involved operatives or property in more than one state.
Under both views, however, any combination or conspiracy whose
members were entirely within a single state fell within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the states themselves -regardless of the intended destina-
tion of the products. Federal antitrust law and state antitrust law were
intended to be applied to mutually exclusive activities."
Federal Power to Legislate Under the Commerce Clause: 1983
The original understanding of the Sherman Act's framers concerning
the commerce clause reach of the statute, and the opinion in E.C. Knight,
are both ancient history. E.C. Knight was overruled fifty years later in
another sugar case which held that a price-fixing agreement among local
refiners all located within one state was within the reach of the Sherman
Act.4
Today very little of the intent of the Fifty-First Congress with respect
to this issue remains.4 Nonetheless, in spite of the fact that the founda-
tion of congressional intent concerning the relationship between state and
federal antitrust law has been thoroughly uprooted, state antitrust law
is continually justified and defined by this same congressional "intent."43
THE PLAINTIFF'S CHOICE OF LAW: THE EXPANDING
SCOPE OF STATE ANTITRUST PROTECTION
Not only has the 1890's notion of the extraterritorial limits of state
power all but vanished; the idea that federal antitrust law is aggressive
while state antitrust law is relatively passive is rapidly dying as well.
It is no longer a foregone conclusion that if an effect on interstate com-
merce is present, a plaintiff would fare better under federal law than
in a state court under state law.
A plaintiff might opt for state law for a number of reasons: (1) the state
E.C. Knight, 156 U.S. at 13.
4' Mandeville Island Farms, Inc.-v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219 (1948).
4' For an account of the expansion of federal power under the commerce clause, see
Stern, The Commerce Clause and the National Economy, 59 HARV. L. REv. 645, 883 (1946);
see also L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 232-38 (1978).
.' See Federated Dept. Stores, Inc. v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394, 407-08 (1981) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting); State v. Lawn King, 150 N.J. Super. 204, 375 A.2d 295, 301 (N.J. Super. Ct.
Law Div. 1977), rev'd on other grounds, 169 N.J. Super. 346, 404 A2d 1215 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 1979), aff'd, 84 N.J. 179, 417 A.2d 1025 (1980). Project, supra note 4, at 565-69.
See generally, Mosk, State Antitrust Enforcement and Coordination with Federal Enforce-
ment, 21 A.B.A. ANTITRUST SEC. REP. 358 (1962). It may have been the intent of the Fifty-
First Congress to reserve to the states the right to entertain suits for actual damages,
while reserving to the federal courts the authority to award treble damages. If so, con-
gressional intent appears to have been disregarded. See Note, Exclusive Jurisdiction of
the Federal Courts in Private Civil Actions, 70 HARV. L. REV. 509, 510 n.13 (1957).
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antitrust law might condemn some activity that would be permissible
under federal law;" (2) the plaintiff might have standing or an action for
damages under state law but not under federal law; (3) the plaintiff might
wish to avail itself of a more flexible state procedural rule, such as the
relatively liberalized class action damages rules that prevail in some
states;' (4) the plaintiff might wish to avoid consolidation and transfer
with other parties in a large, multidistrict federal antitrust proceeding."
As a general rule, a plaintiff has a right to opt for state antitrust law
for these reasons or for any others. Implicit in the doctrine of federalism
and our countenance of a two-tier, federal-state antitrust enforcement
scheme is a concession that state legislatures and state courts are entitled
to be different. Nevertheless, under certain circumstances a plaintiff's
choice to plead state law can cause substantial difficulty for private en-
forcement -of federal antitrust, particularly in view of the greatly expanded
extraterritorial reach of state antitrust laws.
Commerce Clause Limitations on State Antitrust
It is sometimes said that the commerce clause of the United States
Constitution imposes substantial limits on the power of states to apply
their antitrust statutes to activities in or affecting interstate commerce. 8
In fact, however, there is reason to doubt that this is the case. Today,
the power of states to regulate under the commerce clause must be viewed
in the context of three paradigms. First, in areas where Congress has
not spoken, the "dormant" commerce clause restricts the power of states
to pass regulations that interfere with the free flow of goods and ser-
vices from one state to another or impose greater burdens on interstate
commerce than they impose on purely local activities. 9 Second, in areas
" See cases cited supra note 10.
"5 See supra note 11.
" See Bruno v. Superior Ct., 127 Cal. App. 3d 120, 179 Cal. Rptr. 342 (1981) (permitting
fluid recovery in a state antitrust class action); Ohio ex rel. Brown v. Klosterman French
Baking Co., 1977-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 61,361 (S.D. Ohio 1977) (no statute of limitations
under Ohio antitrust law).
" See infra notes 78-204 and accompanying text.
" See Beltone Electronics Corp. v. Selbst, 1977-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 61,586 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. Aug. 17, 1977) at 72,387, affd rnem., 61 A.D.2d 966, 403 N.Y.S.2d 1019 (1978); In re Wir-
ing Device Antitrust Litig., 498 F. Supp. 79, 82 (E.D.N.Y. 1980). See State v. Lawn King,
Inc., 150 N.J. Super. 204, 218-19, 375 A.2d 295, 302-03 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1977), rev'd
on other grounds, 169 N.J. Super. 346, 404 A.2d 1215 (N.J. Super. App. Div. 1979), aff'd,
84 N.J. 179, 417 A.2d 1025 (1980), holding that anything affecting interstate commerce so
as to be within jurisdiction of the Sherman Act is beyond the constitutional reach of the
state antitrust statute. For a general critique of commerce clause limitations on state
regulatory power, see Eule, Laying the Dormant Commerce Clause to Rest, 91 YALE L.J.
425 (1982).
" Hughes v. Oklahoma, 41 U.S. 322, 331-32 (1979); Raymond Motor Transport, Inc. v.
Rice, 434 U.S. 429, 441-44 (1978) (both cases citing Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S.
137, 142 (1970)). See generally L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §§ 6-5 to -13 (1978).
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that Congress actively regulates, state regulation might be preempted
by a federal statute under the supremacy clause."0 Third, Congress has
the authority to give the states broad power to regulate interstate com-
merce. For example, the McCarran-Ferguson Act5 permits the states to
regulate interstate aspects of the insurance industry that they would not
have power to regulate absent federal authorization. The statute allows
states to levy discriminatory state insurance taxes that fall more heavily
on out of state companies than on local companies.2 Such a statute would
certainly fall under the commerce clause were it not for the federal ena-
bling legislation.5 3 Under the statute, however, state power to regulate is
plenary. In fact, the Supreme Court concluded that "if Congress ordains
that the states may freely regulate an aspect of interstate commerce,
any action taken by a state within the scope of the congressional authoriza-
tion is rendered invulnerable to Commerce Clause challenge."'
In passing the antitrust laws Congress intended to permit states to
have their own antitrust legislation and enforcement.5 However, the
federal antitrust laws do not do for antitrust what the McCarran-Ferguson
Act does for insurance. They do not provide that antitrust regulation is
the exclusive domain of the states; on the contrary, they create a vast
federal network of antitrust enforcement which coexists with state anti-
trust law.
However, the existence of federal antitrust legislation creates a dif-
ficult problem in determining the proper scope of state power. As a mat-
ter of history, applications of state antitrust laws to situations "in or af-
fecting" interstate commerce have rarely been condemned and nearly all
cases that did condemn such applications were decided before 1935, when
judges had a much more restrictive view of the power of the states to
regulate in interstate commerce, or to exercise their jurisdiction over per-
sons outside the state. 6 The Supreme Court has upheld applications of
Edgar v. Mite Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 630 (1982); Campbell v. Hussey, 368 U.S. 297, 301-02
(1961). See Castle v. Hayes Freight Lines, 348 U.S. 61 (1954). But see, Exxon Corp. v. Gover-
nor of Md., 437 U.S. 117, 128-29 (1978). See generally L. TRIBE, supra note 49, at %5 6-23 to -26.
s15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1012 (1976).
52 See Prudential Ins. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408 (1946).
See Boston Stock Exch. v. State Tax Comm'n, 429 U.S. 318 (1977). See generally L.
TRIBE, supra note 49, at § 6-16.
Western and Southern Life Ins. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 451 U.S. 648 (1981).
5 See supra notes 13-18 and accompanying text.
Nearly all cases condemning such applications were decided before 1935, when judges
viewed the states' power to regulate interstate commerce as more restrictive. Hadley Dean
Plate Glass Co. v. Highland Glass Co., 143 F. 242 (8th Cir. 1906); In re Grice, 79 F. 627
(N.D. Tex. 1897), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Baker v. Grice, 169 U.S. 284 (1898); People
v. North River Sugar Ref. Co., 121 N.Y. 582, 24 N.E. 834 (1890); J.R. Watkins Medical Co.
v. Holloway, 182 Mo. App. 140, 168 S.W. 290 (1914). But see Standard Oil Co. v. Tennessee,
217 U.S. 413 (1910).
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state antitrust laws where significant interstate commerce or extrater-
ritorial activity is involved, generally on the theory that the state anti-
trust law was consistent with federal policy. For example, in Standard
Oil Co. of Kentucky v. Tennessee,' the Supreme Court upheld the applica-
tion of Tennessee antitrust law to the activities of a Kentucky corpora-
tion which had conspired with Tennessee retailers, resulting in higher
oil prices in Tennessee.
No modern court, however, has ruled that state antitrust statutes can
be applied to interstate commerce without limit. 8 Some courts have sug-
gested as a standard for such a limit that a state should not have the
power to condemn activities that have no injurious effect within the state
itself.9 Although this standard may reflect sound policy, it is more a
general description of the legislative jurisdiction of the state than of its
power under the commerce clause. Not even Congress could give a state
the power to apply its laws in violation of the due process clause. 0 When
the due process clause or the full faith and credit clause is applied to
a state's use of its law to a particular transaction, one must look at the
state's interest sought to be protected. That interest is measured in part
217 U.S. 413 (1910); see also Givoney v. Empire Storage & Ice, 336 U.S. 490, 502 (1949);
RahI, Toward a Worthwhile State Antitrust Policy, 39 TEXAs L. REV. 753, 760-63 (1961).
1 One Second Circuit opinion, however, doubts that there are such limits: "Our diffi-
culty lies in determining to what extent, if at all, the states are precluded from antitrust
regulation of interstate commerce:' Flood v. Kuhn, 443 F.2d 264, 267 (2nd Cir. 1971), affjd
on other grounds, 407 U.S. 258 (1972). One might assume that a state could not pass an
antitrust law that discriminated against out-of-state businesses-that is, that congressional
permission with respect to state antitrust does not go as far as congressional permission
with respect to state regulation of insurance. But see Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Md.,
437 U.S. 117, 125-27 (1978). For the remarkably different treatment accorded to state
securities legislation, see Edgar v. Mite Corp., 457 U.S. 624 (1982) in which a badly divided
Supreme Court held that an Illinois takeover statute that applied to out-of-state companies
was unconstitutional under the commerce clause. The Supreme Court stressed the fact
that the statute at issue had substantial extraterritorial effects and that the burdens of
the statute imposed on interstate commerce were excessive compared to the interests of
the state. Id. at 643-47.
" See, e.g., Leader Theatre Corp. v. Randforce Amusement Corp., 186 Misc. 280, 283,
58 N.Y.S.2d 304, 307 (Sup. Ct. 1945), affd, 273 App. Div. 844, 76 N.Y.S.2d 846 (1948). "It
is now well established that states ... can enact and implement legislation which affects
interstate commerce, when such commerce has significant local consequences." This rule
was applied to preclude jurisdiction when the conspiracy was formulated within the forum
state, whose law was being applied, but the consequences were entirely in another state:
Baker v. Walter Reade Theatres, Inc., 37 Misc. 2d 172, 237 N.Y.S.2d 795 (1962).
" However, federal constitutional limits on a state's power to apply its law to an out
of state transaction are not substantial. See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302 (1981);
E. SCOLES & P. HAY. CONFLICT OF LAWS 87-89 (1982); see generally Weinberg, Choice of Law
and Miniriml Scrutiny, 49 U. CHL L. REv. 440,448 (1982) (suggesting that there are "no limits
whatsoever on the choice of an interested State's law"); Hill, Choice of Law and Jurisdiction
in the Supreme Court, 81 COLUM. L. REv. 960 (1981); Juenger, Supreme Court Intervention
in Jurisdiction and Choice of Law: A Dismal Prospect, 14 U.C.D. L. REV. 907 (1981); Kozyris,
Reflections on Allstate-The Lessening of Due Process in Choice of Law, 14 U.C.D. L. REV.
889 (1981); Martin, supra note 33.
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by examining the effect that the transaction had within the state or upon
the people whom the state protects. 1
The commerce clause, however, generally imposes a different kind of
limitation on state power. The doctrine of legislative jurisdiction is
designed to keep one state from encroaching upon the sovereignty of
another state and to ensure that people are not treated unfairly by states
with which they have minimal contacts.2 The commerce clause issue in
state antitrust litigation, however, is not often the sovereignty of one
state vis-a-vis the sovereignty of another, nor is it the relationship to
the injury felt within the state. The issue is the authority of a state to
apply its law to a transaction in the face of a conflicting federal interest.'
Resolution of the commerce clause issue should not focus on extrater-
ritoriality but on the preservation of a unified, mutually reinforcing, two
level antitrust enforcement scheme. The concept of sovereignty based
on interest or territoriality that influences state choice-of-law doctrine
is simply unable to accommodate antitrust injuries that are not confined
within state boundaries. Theoretically, every price-fixing conspiracy in
the United States injures everyone in the United States." Most extrater-
ritorial applications of state antitrust law recognize only what is obvious:
that a price-fixing conspiracy in Florida can hurt Californians just as much
as a price-fixing conspiracy in California." In fact, most assertions of state
antitrust authority which conflicts with assertions of federal antitrust
authority lie in areas where the effect of the violation in the forum state
is obvious and is not an issue in the case.66
Conflicts between states as sovereigns are generally horizontal and are
often closely related to geography and to physical territoriality. When
a state court seeks to reach persons or transactions outside the state,
it balances the right of the forum state to protect people or property
within its territory against the competing rights of other states to do
the same and the right of people from other states to be treated fairly.6 7
Although questions of personal jurisdiction and choice of law often raise
federal issues under the due process clause or the full faith and credit
clause, the conflicts are not between the federal and the state govern-
6" See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 334 (1981) (Powell, J., dissenting). See
also Reese, Legislative Jurisdiction, supra note 7, at 1602.
62 See discussion infra notes 77-153 and accompanying text.
6 See infra notes 154-76 and accompanying text.
" See St. Joe Paper v. Superior Court, 120 Cal. App. 3d 991, 175 Cal. Rptr. 94 (1981),
cert. denied, 445 U.S. 982 (1982).
65 Id.
See, e.g., Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Md., 437 U.S. 117 (1978), reh'g denied, 439 U.S.
884 (1978); Three J Farms Inc. v. Plaintiff's Steering Comm., 659 F.2d 1332 (5th Cir. 1981),
cert. denied, 456 U.S. 998 (1982); California v. California and Hawaiian Sugar Co., 588 F.2d
1270 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 998 (1982).
But see Korn, The Choire-of-Law Revolution: A Critique, 83 COLUM. L. REv. 772,799-800
(1983) (criticizing modern interest analysis); Ely, supra note 33 (same).
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ment. The conflicts occur between states or between one state and the
citizens of a different state. In these cases of competing sovereigns, it
makes sense to examine the relationship between a state and a particular
transaction by looking at the effects of the transaction within the forum
state.
Conflicts between state and federal authority, on the other hand, are
generally vertical. Although they are occasionally resolved by reference
to geography,68 the geographical reach of the Sherman Act and of state
antitrust law in fact overlap almost to the point of congruity 9 Although
the interest of a particular state may be weaker when it seeks to apply
its law to an out-of-state activity, the interest of the federal government
under those circumstances is not necessarily stronger unless the asser-
tion of state authority violates the Constitution."0
Federal antitrust law today applies to real estate brokers, agricultural
products located completely within a single state, and even hospital
services.7 ' The result of this expansive reach is that the overwhelming
majority of assertions of state antitrust are in areas within the reach
of federal antitrust law as well. In other words, the classification of
restraints as purely intrastate and thus within the exclusive jurisdiction
of state antitrust, or interstate and thus within the exclusive domain of
federal law has long since passed. The vitality of this distinction is the
exception rather than the rule.
72
The demise of the interstate-intrastate distinction forces the issue of
state antitrust power under the commerce clause back to the question
of preemption. Preemption is in turn a question of congressional intent
and not of constitutional interpretation. However, the congressional in-
tent of the Sherman Act's framers in the late nineteenth century is in-
appropriate to the modern situation. 3 Since the Supreme Court has held
in a long line of cases that preemption is not to be presumed or inferred,74
and because Congress clearly intended that state antitrust law not be
11 See, e.g., Heille v. City of St. Paul, 671 F.2d 1134 (8th Cir. 1982) (restraint described
as "local" and thus outside the reach of federal antitrust laws).
" See, e.g., McLain v. Real Estate Bd. of New Orleans, Inc., 444 U.S. 232 (1980) (finding
interstate commerce under Sherman Act in case of price-fixing in one state and effects
in another).
71 Congress of course has the power to use federal antitrust laws to preempt most ex-
traterritorial applications of state antitrust law, but it has chosen not to exercise that power.
71 See McLain, supra note 69; see also Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Trustees of Rex Hosp., 425
U.S. 738 (1976); but see Cardio-Medical Assoc., Ltd. v. Crozer-Chester Medical Center, 42
ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) 623 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 15, 1982).
n But see State v. Lawn King, 150 N.J. Super. 204, 218-19, 375 A.2d 295, 301 (N.J. Super.
Ct. Law Div. 1977), rev'd on other grounds, 169 N.J. Super. 346, 404 A.2d 1215 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 1979), aff'd, 84 N.J. 179, 417 A.2d 1025 (1980).
" See sources and cases cited supra notes 12-17 and accompanying text.
7' See Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Md., 437 U.S. 117, 130-31 (1978), reh'g denied, 439
U.S. 884 (1978).
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preempted as a general matter,7 5 there are virtually no operative limits
on the reach of state antitrust law under the commerce clause.78
Legislative Jurisdiction and Choice of Law
Legislative jurisdiction is the power of a state to apply its law to a
particular transaction. 71 It should be distinguished from judicial jurisdic-
tion which is the power of a state to try a case in its courts." The term
legislative jurisdiction is most often used to describe the constitutional
power of a state to apply its law to a transaction or event that occurred
outside the geographic territory of the state.7 9 Similarly, one of the most
important elements of the doctrine of judicial jurisdiction is personal
jurisdiction, or the power of a court to summon before it a person who
is not within the territory of the sovereign that created the court.'
Although legislative jurisdiction is at the heart of choice-of-law doc-
trine, the concept of choice of law is broader than the concept of legislative
jurisdiction. In most conflicts cases, choice of law is governed not by con-
stitutional limits on state power, but by considerations of comity or public
policy that frequently encourage a state court not to apply its own law
to a transaction even though it would have the constitutional power to
do so.81 On the other hand, the tendency of state legislatures and courts
is to go to the full constitutional limit of their powers when they are assert-
ing personal jurisdiction."
T See sources and cases cited supra notes 13-18 and accompanying text.
7 In no case since the 1940's has a federal court held that a state antitrust statute
is unconstitutional under the federal Constitution because it exceeds state power under
the commerce clause. One should distinguish cases where, as a matter of state law, a state
statute was held inapplicable to a certain activity outside the state or in interstate com-
merce. Federal preemption of state antitrust laws has been found occasionally, but the
basis for preemption was not federal antitrust law, but some other federal statute, such
as the National Labor Relations Act. See sources and cases cited infra at note 172. When
state antitrust laws are alleged to be in direct conflict with federal antitrust law, the courts
have found them not to be so in spite of important substantive differences between the
two bodies of law. See Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Md., 437 U.S. 117, 129-32 (1978); Shell
Oil v. Younger, 587 F.2d 34 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 947 (1979).
At least one state legislature has taken explicit advantage of the broad scope of state
antitrust power under the commerce clause. See the Florida Antitrust Act of 1980, FLA.
STAT. ANN. S 542.31 (West Supp. 1982):
No action under this chapter shall be barred on the grounds that the activity
or conduct complained of in any way affects or involves interstate or foreign
commerce. It is the intent of the Legislature to exercise its power to the fullest
extent consistent with the Constitutions of this state and the United States.
See generally R. WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 495-547 (2nd ed.
1980); Martin, The Constitution and Legislative Jurisdiction, 10 HOFSTRA L. REV. 133 (1981);
Reese supra note 7.
71 See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 24-79 (1971); Reese, supra
note 7.
See generally R. WEINTRAUB, supra note 77, at 495-547; Reese, supra note 7.
See generally R. WEINTRAUB. supra note 77, at 90-185.
8! See Martin, supra note 33, at 202.
See R. WEINTRAUB, supra note 77, at 152.
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One reason that state courts more frequently stretch personal jurisdic-
tion to its constitutional limit than they do legislative jurisdiction is that
today constitutional limits on personal jurisdiction are more severe than
the constitutional limits on legislative jurisdiction. A series of recent
United States Supreme Court cases has further widened this gap.,
In a well developed line of cases beginning in the 1940's" the Supreme
Court required that in order for a state court to assert its authority over
someone outside the state, that person must have certain "minimum con-
tacts" with the state.85 These contacts must be sufficient to show that
the defendant has somehow "personally availed" himself of the privilege
of conducting business or other affairs within the forum state. 6 Further-
more, the defendant's contacts with the forum state must be sufficiently
direct that the defendant could reasonably foresee a lawsuit in the forum
state .
7
In spite of a recent Supreme Court opinion,88 the limits of state power
in applying its own law to a transaction that occurs outside the state
are less clearly articulated than is state court personal jurisdiction. In
Allstate Insurance Company v. Hague,89 the Supreme Court upheld the
power of Minnesota to apply its insurance law to an accident that occur-
red in Wisconsin. Both the accident victim and the claimant (the victim's
wife) were domiciled in Wisconsin and the deceased had purchased the
insurance policy there. Although these facts suggested that application
of Wisconsin law would be far more sensible,' the United States Supreme
" Recent Supreme Court decisions limiting the power of states to exercise personal
jurisdiction include: Ins. Co. of Ireland, Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxite Guinee 456.U.S.
694 (1982); World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980); Rush v. Savchuk,
444 U.S. 320 (1980); Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84 (1978); Shaffer v. Heitner, 433
U.S. 186 (1977). A recent Supreme Court case confirming broader powers of a state to
apply its law to an out-of-state transaction is Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302 (1981).
For an analysis and critique of this apparent divergence, see Hill, supra note 60. The Supreme
Court itself recognized this divergence in Kulko, 436 U.S. at 98, where it suggested that
although there was no personal jurisdiction in California over the out of state defendant,
California law might "arguably" apply to the cause of action. As recently as two decades
ago, this divergence was not apparent, and some scholars believed that the limits of state
personal and legislative jurisdiction were converging. See Leflar, The Converging Limits
of State Jurisdictional Powers, 9 J. PUB. L. 282 (1960).
The constitutional limits of state personal jurisdiction and of state legislative jurisdic-
tion both are governed by the fourteenth amendment due process clause, although in many
cases the full faith and credit clause acts as an additional limitation on state assertions
of legislative jurisdiction. See R. WEINTRAUB, supra note 77, at 517-42. However, today it
appears that the standard for constitutional limitations on state choice of law is virtually
the same, regardless of which clause of the Constitution it is analyzed under. See Allstate
Ins. Co., 449 U.S. at 308 n.10. See generally Sedler, Constitutional Limitations on Choice
of Law: The Perspective of Constitutional Generalism, 10 HOFSTRA L. REv. 59 (1981).
E.g., International Shoe v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316.
Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958).
World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297.
Allstate Ins. Co., 449 U.S. 302.9Id.
' See id. at 324 (Stevens, J., concurring); Weintraub, Who's Afraid of Constitutional Limita-
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Court held that the Minnesota law could be applied for three reasons:
the decedent was a member of the Minnesota work force and commuted
daily across state lines;9 the defendant insurance company was present
and doing business in Minnesota;9 and the claimant moved to Minnesota
after the accident but before she initiated the lawsuit. The court thus
concluded that there was a sufficient "aggregation of contacts" between
the forum state, the parties, and the occurrence to create state interests
supporting the application of Minnesota law.94 This outcome is at least
verbally consistent with the well established rule that a state may apply
its law to an activity outside the state if the state has a legitimate in-
terest based on a "sufficiently substantial contact with the activity in
question .. . ."' The Allstate Co. Court did not provide much guidance,
however, as to the definition of a "sufficiently substantial contact.""
Questions of legislative jurisdiction have not often played a significant
role in state antitrust adjudication, largely because plaintiffs have
generally had well developed interests within the forum state.' Where
the issue has arisen, the courts have dealt with it as a question of state
power under the commerce clause 9 and not as a question of state power
to legislate outside its territory under the due process clause. Never-
theless, concepts of legislative jurisdiction can and ought to play a role
in determining the outer limits of state antitrust law in a federal system.
These concepts are particularly important when the antitrust law of a
particular state is broader in its scope of liability than federal antitrust
law is, and when that broader liability is likely to drag within its net
people whose contact with the state is minimal.
tions on Choice of Law? 10 HOFSTRA L. REV. 17, 24 (1981).
11 However, the accident did not occur while the deceased was commuting to work. Allstate
Ins. Co., 449 U.S. at 314.
Id. at 317.
Id. at 318.
Id. at 320.
'5 Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1, 15 (1962). What that contact must be, and how
substantial it must be, remains unclear.
Apparently, however, the state may apply its own law to a defendant if the defendant
is "present and doing business" within the state. In assessing this "present and doing
business" requirement, the Supreme Court in Allstate Insurance explicitly suggested that
the "doing business" requirement to support a state's choice of law against a, out-of-state
defendant is less than the "doing business" requirement necessary to support the state's
assertion of personal jurisdiction over the defendant. Thus it would appear that any time
an out-of-state defendant is "doing business" within a state sufficiently to support the state
court's assertion of personal jurisdiction, it is also doing a sufficient amount of business
to support the application of the state's law. See Allstate Ins. Co., 449 U.S. at 317 n.23.
See generally Sedler, supra note 83.
1 But see Baker v. Walter Reade Theatres, Inc., 37 Misc. 2d 172, 173, 237 N.Y.S.2d 795,
796 (1962) (holding that the defendant's activities had no "significant local consequences").
98 See, e.g., St. Joe Paper Co. v. Superior Court, 120 Cal. App. 3d 991, 175 Cal. Rptr.
94 (1981), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 982 (1982); R.E. Spriggs Co. v. Adolph Coors Co., 37 Cal.
App. 3d 653, 112 Cal. Rptr. 585 (1974).
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St. Joe Paper v. Superior Court99 illustrates the nature of this problem.
At issue was the validity of service of process on several paper companies
allegedly involved in a giant corrugated paper price-fixing conspiracy. The
plaintiffs were indirect purchasers from California and brought their ac-
tion under the Cartwright Act, California's state antitrust law which ex-
pressly permits indirect purchasers to sue for treble damages.'0 The defen-
dants were from Michigan and Florida and had sold their products to
distributors located outside California and who themselves were not part
of the conspiracy. The distributors in turn sold the products to the Califor-
nia plaintiffs and delivered them there. All parts of the alleged conspiracy
were formulated and performed outside California. Although the defen-
dants did not sell their products within California, they knew that some
of their products were being resold into California markets.'0'
The California Court of Appeal held that the trial court had properly
obtained personal jurisdiction"2 over the defendants for several reasons.
First, the defendants had committed a tortious act outside the state of
California which had foreseeable effects within the state.' The Court
distinguished World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson' by noting that in St.
Joe Paper the "foreseeability" at issue was not the mere likelihood that
the paper companies' products would enter California, but rather the cer-
tain knowledge that some of the paper being manufactured was to be
sold to California purchasers. 10' The defendants "admittedly elected to
indirectly serve the market in California .... "106 Furthermore, the court
observed that the cause of action arose out of the above-described forum-
related activity.'01
St. Joe Paper raises an interesting policy issue that was not addressed
by the court. That issue is not the court's personal jurisdiction over the
defendants, but rather the state's legislative jurisdiction to condemn price-
fixing in remote parts of the country. That issue is made more difficult
because the plaintiffs were indirect purchasers. Although under federal
120 Cal. App. 3d 991, 175 Cal. Rptr. 94 (1981), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 982 (1981).
lC Act of Aug. 24, 1978, ch. 536, 1978 Cal. Stat. 1693 which provides, in part, that a
treble damages action may be brought "by any person who is injured in his business or
property by reason of anything forbidden ... by this chapter, regardless of whether such
injured person dealt directly or indirectly with the defendant" (codified as amended at
CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE S 16759(a) (West Supp. 1981)).
"I St. Joe Paper, 120 Cal. App. 3d at 994-95, 175 Cal. Rptr. at 95-96. One of the defen-
dants, Consolidated Packing Corp., had made one unsolicited sale in California directly
to a California wholesale customer. However, that customer was not a party in the case.
"0 California has a very expansive long-arm statute: "A Court of this state may exercise
jurisdiction on any basis not inconsistent with the Constitution of this state or of the United
States." CAL. CIVIL CODE § 410.10 (1970).
103 St. Joe Paper, 120 Cal. App. 3d at 997, 175 Cal. Rptr. at 97.
104 444 U.S. 286 (1980). See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
"o St. Joe Paper, 120 Cal. App. 3d at 998-99, 175 Cal. Rptr. at 99.
I d.
Id. at 1000, 175 Cal. Rptr. at 99.
1983]
INDIANA LA W JOURNAL
law an indirect purchaser cannot pursue an action for damages,"'5 it is
widely conceded that indirect purchasers two or three times removed
in the market from the conspirators can suffer injury as a result of
price-fixing."9 In other words, a rule that an indirect purchaser in Califor-
nia could use the California antitrust law to reach a conspiracy elsewhere
when the defendants have made no direct sales into California would give
the state legislature the power to condemn antitrust violations nation-
wide; as a result, the Cartwright Act would then reach as far as the Sher-
man Act."'
Under current choice-of-law doctrine, California probably does have a
sufficient interest in the cause of action in St. Joe Paper to support the
application of its own law."' Like the federal Clayton Act, California's
Cartwright Act provides that "any person who is injured in his business
or property by reason of anything forbidden" by the state antitrust laws
may recover treble damages for injuries sustained."' California's interest
in protecting injuries to the business or property of its own citizens is
certainly appropriate under current choice-of-law analysis; indeed, it ap-
pears to be substantially greater than the interest required by the
Supreme Court in Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague.'
... Illinois Brick v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977).
109 See Harris & Sullivan, Passing on the Monopoly Overcharge: A Comprehensive Policy
Analysis, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 269 (1979); Landes & Posner, Should Indirect Purchasers Have
Standing to Sue Under the Antitrust Laws? An Economic Analysis of the Rule of Illinois
Brick, 46 U. Cim. L. REV. 602 (1979); Landes & Posner, The Economics of Passing On: A Reply
to Harris and Sullivan, 128 U. PA. L. REv. 1274 (1980).
10 As a federal court observed in 1897, when considering an analogous provision of a
Texas antitrust statute, such a rule would make it "unnecessary for any other state or
the nation at large to have any other laws upon the subject, as all persons within the
limits of the United States could be regulated ... according to the wishes of the legislature
of Texas... In re Grice, 79 F. 627, 639 (N.D. Tex. 1897), rev'd on other grounds sub nom.
Baker v. Grice, 169 U.S. 284 (1894); see also Silberman, Can the State of Minnesota Bind
the Nation? Federal Choice-of-Law Constraints After Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 10 HOFSTRA
L. REV. 103 (1981).
In the great majority of cases raising the issue, federal courts applying federal antitrust
law base personal jurisdiction on the forum state's long-arm statute. If the defendant is
a corporation, its contacts may be "aggregated" across the country as a whole under S
12 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. S 22 (1976). See, e.g., Black v. Acme Markets, Inc., 564
F.2d 681 (5th Cir. 1977). Aggregate contracts have not often been used, however, to justify
an assertion of jurisdiction over a defendant who did not have sufficient contacts with
the forum state to permit use of the state's long-arm statute. See generally Hovenkamp,
Personal Jurisdiction and Venue in Private Antitrust Actions in the Federal Courts: A Policy
Analysis, 67 IowA L. REV. 485 (1982).
Since the federal court usually bases federal antitrust jurisdiction on the state's long-
arm statute, and since state power to apply its law is generally broader than state ad-
judicatory power over a defendant located elsewhere, it would appear that the jurisdic-
tional reach of a state antitrust law could be just as broad as the jurisdictional reach of
federal law from a federal court located in the same state.
.. Cf. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302 (1981). See supra notes 88-95 and accompa-
nying text.
1 See sources cited supra note 100.
1 See supra notes 88-95 and accompanying text.
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Nevertheless, the extraterritorial application of state antitrust law in
St. Joe Paper can be offensive to the two-tier, federal-state antitrust en-
forcement mechanism. The limitation of certain damage actions to direct
purchasers reflects a federal policy of avoiding multiple recovery against
defendants. Absent this limitation, a defendant could be liable once to
direct purchasers for the full injury sustained, and a second time to in-
direct purchasers further down the distribution chain."' This federal policy
might not be noticeably impaired by a half dozen state antitrust statutes115
that give indirect purchasers damage actions, provided that the applica-
tion of such laws is restricted to defendants or activities located within
the state. However, under current case law, California can apply its
indirect-purchaser rule to almost any defendant in the nation over whom
it can obtain personal jurisdiction, if the plaintiffs business or property
has been injured."6
Conversely, state antitrust laws are an important part of our antitrust
enforcement scheme. Furthermore, the doctrine that states can condemn
activity elsewhere which injures its citizens at home is a well established
and essential part of the jurisprudence of federalism."7 Equally important
to federalism is the principle that state antitrust laws may sometimes
be different from federal antitrust laws in their scope of liability or in
the protection they create. Congress has not declared that state antitrust
laws are legitimate only when they are identical with federal law.1 8 The
doctrine of federal supremacy applies only when an assertion of state
power substantially frustrates the policies of the federal antitrust
system."'
R.E. Spriggs v. Adolph Coors Co.,2' illustrates a less problematic ex-
traterritorial application of state antitrust law. Coors manufactured its
beer in Colorado, and sold it F.O.B. Golden, Colorado, to various wholesale
distributors in the western United States. Coors itself was not present
in California, but the written distribution agreements between Coors and
its distributors designated exclusive territories within which each
' Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. at 730.
,, See sources cited supra note 11.
See cases cited supra notes 102-07 and accompanying text. The purchase of an article
within the forum state at an excessive price, even by a consumer, is an injury to business
or property. See Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330 (1979). It is also an event that
takes place within the forum state justifying application of the forum state's law under
both traditional and modern choice-of-law rules. See Martin, The Constitution and Legislative
Jurisdiction, 10 HOFSTRA L. REV. 133, 142-43 (1981). In short, any price-fixing conspiracy
anywhere in the United States or the world could yield a state antitrust action by an in-
direct purchaser consumer who purchased the product in California, provided that the Califor-
nia court could obtain personal jurisdiction.
See generally R. WEINTRAUB, supra note 77, at 495-547.
"' See Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Md., 437 U.S. 117, 133-34 (1978).
Id. at 132.
"' 37 Cal. App. 3d 653, 112 Cal. Rptr. 585 (1974).
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distributor could resell its beer. The plaintiff brought suit alleging that
these vertically-imposed territorial divisions were illegal in California
under the Cartwright Act.12
In holding that the activity could be reached under the Cartwright Act,
the California court noted that "the activity complained of has a factual
nexus solely within the State of California,"1 because the territorial divi-
sion mechanism explicitly controlled the plaintiffs operations within
California. By specific contract provisions, the defendant aimed its anti-
competitive activity directly at the California resale market."
The effects of price-fixing, unlike the activity in R.E. Spriggs are more
promiscuous. When a cartel is organized in Florida to fix the prices of
paper boxes, the members of the conspiracy may presume that their prod-
uct will find its way into every state. However, this knowledge is
somewhat akin to the knowledge of a New England car dealer that one
of the automobiles it sells may eventually find its way into Oklahoma. 24
As long as the defendant has not in someway targeted California for its
marketing activities, the threat of state overextension becomes substan-
tially more serious in price-fixing cases where the state has granted
damage actions to indirect purchasers. The issue in such a case is not
the reach of the antitrust laws under the commerce clause-the amount
of interstate commerce is not less because the purchaser is indirect-but
rather the legislative power of California to condemn activity occurring
outside the state under such circumstances." 5
12 The Cartwright Act imposed the same test for liability in vertical territorial division
cases as the Sherman Act. At the time the action was brought, vertical territorial division
was a per se violation of the Sherman Act. U.S. v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 338 U.S. 365
(1967). However, subsequently Schwinn was overruled by the United States Supreme Court,
and a rule of reason was applied to vertical territorial division. Continental T.V., Inc. v.
GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977). In a subsequent appeal of the Coors case concerning
a different issue, the appellate court adopted the rule of reason interpretation of the Cart-
wright Act as well. R.E. Spriggs Co. v. Adolph Coors Co., 95 Cal. App. 3d 419, 428, 156
Cal. Rptr. 738 (1979).
1 R.E. Spriggs, 37 Cal. App. 3d at 665, 112 Cal. Rptr. at 593.
3 Presumably, if a plaintiff from Oregon was complaining about the Colorado defen-
dant's territorial division imposed upon it in Oregon, California would not apply its law.
See Reich v. Purcell, 67 Cal. 2d 551, 432 P.2d 727, 63 Cal. Rptr. 31 (1967). However, in
such a case the amount of interstate commerce involved would be the same as it would
be with respect to territorial divisions in California. The illustration suggests that although
the California court in Spriggs v. Coors treated the issue before it as one of state antitrust
power under the commerce clause, the issue should more properly have been considered
as one of choice-of-law.
12 See World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
2 If the current interpretation of the "aggregate contacts" test in Black v. Acme Markets,
Inc., 564 F.2d 681 (5th Cir. 1977) is correct, then a corporate defendant who violated the
federal antitrust laws anywhere in the United States would be within the jurisdictional
reach of any federal court in the United States, provided it was served with process under
15 U.S.C. S 22 (1976). However, the federal venue statutes would still give such a defen-
dant substantial protection: it could be sued only in a district in which it was actually
present or doing business. See Hovenkamp, Personal Jurisdiction and Venue in Private
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Two suggestions have been made that would put more distinct limits
on California's ability to condemn out-of-state violations of its antitrust
laws. The first is that a state should not be permitted to apply its law
to an out of state transaction unless the court has specfic- personal jurisdic-
tion over the defendant, that is, personal jurisdiction based on contacts
with the forum state that are related to the cause of action.12 The second
suggestion is that the standards for assertions of legislative jurisdiction
be more restrictive so that they conform more to the current constitu-
tional standards for state court assertions of personal jurisdiction."7
Neither test has been adopted as a due process standard, although several
members of the Supreme Court appear to be searching for stricter limits
on state choice-of-law decisions."
In his concurring opinion in Allstate, Justice Stevens argued that due
process considerations of state choice-of-law decisions ought to focus on
fairness to the litigants." A choice-of-law decision is unfair, argued Justice
Stevens, when the defendant could not reasonably anticipate that it would
be subjected to the law of a particular state." In that case Justice Stevens
concluded, however, that Allstate "was aware that it could be sued in
the Minnesota courts."13' Furthermore, since state courts are inclined to
apply their own law in questionable situations, Allstate could also
reasonably anticipate that if it were sued in a Minnesota court it would
be held accountable under Minnesota law. Under this analysis, Justice
Stevens reasoned that the nature of the insurance policy, which provided
Antitrust Actions in the Federal Courts: A Policy Analysis, 67 IowA L. REV. 485,507-21 (1982).
The state laws provide no such protection. If the state court could constitutionally obtain
service of process although all defendants resided outside the state, in most states venue
would be appropriate somewhere in the state. For example, California provides that if
all defendants reside outside the state, the plaintiff has its choice of venue. See CAL. CIV.
PR0C. CODE S 395 (1972; Hamilton v. Superior Court, 37 Cal. App. 3d 418, 112 Cal. Rptr. 450
(1974). The new Florida Antitrust Act of 1980 provides for venue in the county "in which
the cause of action arose, in which any defendant resides, is found, or has an agent or
in which any act in furtherance of the conduct prohibited ... occurred." FLA. STAT. ANN.
542.30 (West Supp. 1982).
'" See von Mehren, Adjudicatory Jurisdiction: General Theories Compared and Evaluated,
63 B.U.L. REv. 279, 311-12 (1983); Martin, Personal Jurisdiction and Choice of Law, 78 MICH.
L. REV. 872 (1980).
12 See Hill, supra note 60. A third suggestion has been made: the creation of national
choice-of-law rules, either by federal statute or else by federal common law. See Shreve,
In Search of a Choice of Law Reviewing Standard-Reflections on Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague,
66 MINN. L. REv. 327, 337-45 (1982).
"2 See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 US. 302 (1981). The opinion of the Court was signed
only by Justices Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun. Justice Stevens concurred.
Justices Powell and Rehnquist and the Chief Justice dissented. Justice Stewart did not
participate.
' Allstate, 449 U.S. at 326 (Stevens, J., concurring).
127 "[The] desire to prevent unfair surprise to a litigant has been the central concern
in this Court's review of choice-of-law decisions under the Due Process clause." Id. at 327
(Stevens, J., concurring). See also R. WEINTRAUB, supra note 77, at 26-33.
11 Allstate, 449 U.S. at 330.
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nationwide coverage, and the fact that Allstate was doing business in
Minnesota, were dispositive: Allstate could anticipate a lawsuit in
Minnesota.132
Justice Stevens' test for choice-of-law is remarkably similar to the test
for personal jurisdiction created by the court in World-Wide Volkswagen
v. Woodson13 ; in fact, it appears to make personal jurisdiction a pre-
requisite for legislative jurisdiction."M However, Justice Stevens does not
go as far as Professor Martin, who requires that before a state can assert
legislative jurisdiction it must have personal jurisdiction based on con-
tacts related to the cause of action.1 35
Justice Powell's dissent in Allstate would assess a requirement of cer-
tain "significant contacts between the State and the litigation."'13 In
developing this test, Justice Powell articulated two principles. First, the
relationship between the forum state and the subject matter of the litiga-
tion must be sufficiently great so that the defendant "must have known
it might be sued" in the forum state. Second, the state "must have a
legitimate interest in the outcome of the litigation before it."'I Justice
Powell concluded that the application of Minnesota law in the Allstate
case passed the first test: "no reasonable expectations of the parties were
frustrated."''3 9 The application failed the second test, however, because
the application of Minnesota's law would not further any legitimate state
interest. "The forum state has no interest in regulating that conduct of
the insurer unrelated to property, persons, or contracts executed within
the forum State."4 In this case Minnesota's application of its law amounted
to an attempt to regulate Allstate's insurance activities in Wisconsin. The
fact that Allstate also did business (unrelated to the cause of action) in
Wisconsin, the fact that the decedent worked in the forum state, and the
fact that the plaintiff subsequently moved there were irrelevant to the
question of Minnesota's interest."' Justice Powell's dissenting opinion thus
comes close to requiring that a state cannot apply its law to a transaction
unless it has specific personal jurisdiction over the defendant.
The legislative jurisdiction problem confronting the California court in
St. Joe Paper.. is different, however, frdm the choice-of-law problem
132 Id.
444 U.S. 286 (1980).
However, the opinion of the Court specifically rejected the notion that personal jurisdic-
tion in a state is a prerequisite for application of the law of that state. Allstate Ins. Co.,
449 U.S. at 317 n.23.
'31 Martin, supra note 126.
13 Allstate Ins. Co., 449 U.S. at 332.
,s Id. at 333.
Id. at 334.
'3 Id. at 336.
"' Id. at 338.
... To be sure, "Minnesota does not wish its workers to die in automobile accidents, but
permitting stacking will not further this interest." Id. at 339.
142 See supra notes 99-119 and accompanying text.
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presented by Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague. In Allstate the choice was between
the law of Minnesota or the law of Wisconsin. If in a state antitrust case
such as St. Joe Paper, the issue is whether the law to be applied is Califor-
nia's (where the plaintiff does business and te action was filed) or Florida's
(where the defendant's business is located), the choice is easy: if Califor-
nia has a legitimate policy interest in protecting its citizens from antitrust
violations, even if the injured persons are indirect purchasers, then Califor-
nia's interest will not be defeated by an inconsistent requirement under
the Florida antitrust law.113 In St. Joe Paper, however, the conflict would
not be between the antitrust laws of two different states; it would in-
stead revolve around the authority of California to apply its law to ac-
tivities in Florida in the face of an inconsistent federal policy.
The question then becomes somewhat different: given the pervasive
system of federal antitrust regulation, should a price-fixer in Florida be
expected to answer to the antitrust law of a state with which it does
no business under circumstances that are inconsistent with federal anti-
trust policy? The only answer that will protect the integrity and
superiority of the federal antitrust enforcement mechanism seems to be
"no." On the other hand, a state should be allowed to protect its own
interests to the extent that the Constitution and Congress have permitted
it to do so. A reasonable position, therefore, is that a state should be
permitted to apply its antitrust law to an out-of-state transaction only
when the defendant has sufficient contacts related to the transaction so
as to make the court's assertion of jurisdiction reasonable.'
The current paradigm of constitutional analysis of state legislative
power is not very helpful for determining the proper extraterritorial limits
of state antitrust law.' Today, state choice-of-law decisions are considered
as presenting questions of due process or full faith and credit; states are
given a good deal of power to apply their own laws to out-of-state trans-
actions. The only requirements are that the state's interest in the out-
come of the litigation be sufficient and that the defendant not be caught
completely by surprise.'46 A state's power to apply its law in the face
of an inconsistent federal policy, on the other hand, is analyzed under
the supremacy clause and the doctrine of preemption.4 ' The Supreme
Court has made it clear, however, that state antitrust laws are not pre-
empted by the federal antitrust laws, even when the extraterritorial ef-
fect of the state law is substantial.'
Choice-of-law analysis proceeds with an examination of the interest of
"3 Florida Antitrust Act of 1980, FLA. STAT. ANN. S 542.22 (West Supp. 1982).
See generally Martin, supra note 126.
I See supra notes 49-57 and accompanying text.
"' See Weintraub, supra note 90, at 25-33.
"' See supra notes 48-76 and accompanying text.
"' See Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Md., 437 U.S. 121 (1978) infra notes 164-76 and accom-
panying text.
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the state whose law is being applied. In fact, it appears that if the state
can assert any legitimate interest, application of its law will be upheld
provided that the application is not grossly unfair to the defendant.'
On the other hand, preemption analysis concerns the basic questions
of federal power and congressional intent. If Congress has the power to
preempt a certain field, and if Congress has intended to do so, the strength
of the state's interest is irrelevant. 0 One of the clearest examples of such
a paradigm is labor law, where federal law has generally preempted the
field in spite of the fact that states have a very strong economic interest
in local labor activities. 5'
The converse of the above argument is that California's decision to grant
damage actions to indirect purchasers is irrelevant when the vertical
choice-of-law problem of St. Joe Paper is considered. If California has the
power to give a damages action to indirect purchasers at all, then it has
the power to do so when the condemned activity takes place in Florida.
Similarly, if the commerce clause permits California to reach a cartel in
Florida at all, then it permits California to do so when the plaintiff is
an indirect purchaser seeking damages."5'
There is no evidence that Congress has ever wanted to prohibit ex-
.. See Allstate Ins. Co., 449 U.S. at 326 (Stevens, J., concurring); Nevada v. Hall, 440
U.S. 410 (1979) ("IT]he Full Faith and Credit Clause does not require a State to apply another
State's law in violation of its own legitimate public policy."). See generally Weinberg, supra
note 60, at 448; R. WEINTRAUB, supra note 77, at 517-34.
In fact, even the plaintiff's domicile acquired after the conspiracy occurred might give
California a constitutionally recognizable interest in applying its antitrust law. See Allstate
Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. at 319. California courts probably would hold as a matter of
state law that the plaintiff's after-acquired domicile is irrelevant to a choice-of-law deci-
sion. See Reich v. Purcell, 63 Cal. Rptr. 31, 34, 432 P.2d 727, 731 (1967 (per C.J. Traynor). A
rule that based a choice-of-law decision on after-acquired domicile, noted Chief Justice
Traynor, would create monstrous forum-shopping problems. Id. For a critique of interest
analysis in choice of law decision see Ely, Choice of Law and the State's Interest in Protect-
ing Its Own, 23 WM. & MARY L. REV. 173 (1982).
" "Where preemption is found, the state enactment must fall without any effort to ac-
commodate the State's purposes or interests." Community Communications Co. v. City of
Boulder, 455 U.S. 40, 61 (1982) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). The one exception to this rule
is when the state's asserted interest is constitutionally protected from federal regulation.
For example, the tenth amendment offers such protection in some situations. See National
League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976). Under the so-called "state action" exemp-
tion doctrine, the Supreme Court does recognize that a state's interest in certain kinds
of business regulation can create an exemption from federal antitrust regulation. However,
this exemption is predicated on the notion that Congress intended that the antitrust laws
not encroach too severely on the state's regulatory authority. See California Retail Liquor
Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97 (1980); Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341
(1943); Morgan v. Division of Liquor Control, 664 F.2d 353 (2nd Cir. 1981).
"I See, e.g., Amalgmated Ass'n of St., Elec. Ry. & Motor Coach Employees of Am. v.
Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274 (1971); Teamsters Local 20 v. Morton, 377 U.S. 252 (1964); San
Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959); Cox, Labor Law Preemption
Revisited, 85 HARv. L. REV. 1337 (1972).
" At least, it permits the state to do so if the state statute is not in direct conflict
with the federal statute. See Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Md., 437 U.S. 117, 129-30 (1978);
L. TRIBE. supra note 49, at 377-84.
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traterritorial assertions of state antitrust law."s Nevertheless, extrater-
ritorial applications of state antitrust laws can be quite damaging to the
federal antitrust enforcement scheme when the state law is inconsistent
with the federal law.
Extraterritoriality and State Antitrust Law:
The Uneasy Case for Federal Preemption
It appears from the facts of St. Joe Paper v. Superior CourtT1 that
neither the due process clause nor the full faith and credit clause would
bar the application of California's antitrust law, in spite of the fact that
the conspiracy took place outside the state and at least one of the defen-
dants made no direct sales in California. California courts have the power
to reach outside the state in order to protect legitimate state interests,
and California unquestionably has a legitimate interest in protecting its
citizens from illegal price-fixing. Furthermore, no court to date has held
that a state antitrust statute which provides damages to indirect pur-
chasers is void under the supremacy clause for lack of consistency with
federal law. '55
It further appears that the commerce clause does not limit substantially
a state's power to apply its antitrust law to an out of state price-fixing
conspiracy." This power is particularly important with respect to a state
such as California, which not only applies its Cartwright Act to the full
extent of its constitutional power, but which has also contravened federal
policy by giving indirect purchasers a cause of action for damages. The
policy becomes even more problematic considering that the federal law
gives remote defendants venue protections157 that state law may not
provide. 55 The ability of a California plaintiff to sue a particular out-of-
state defendant under the Cartwright Act is effectively limited only by
the power of the California court to obtain personal jurisdiction.
Nevertheless, one qualification might be in order. Many applications
of state law to interstate commerce have been upheld under the com-
'" In 1890, however, the prevailing opinion was that states lacked the constitutional
authority to apply their laws outside their territory. See sources and cases cited supra
notes 19-27.
'" 120 Cal. App. 3d 991, 175 Cal. Rptr. 94 (1981), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 982 (1981) dis-
cussed supra notes 99-119 and accompanying text.
" See generally Note, Indirect Purchaser Suits Under State Antitrust Laws: A Detour
A round the Illinois Brick Wall, supra note 11. See also Note, State Indirect Purchaser Statutes:
The Preemptive Power of Illinois Brick, 62 B.U.L. REV. 1241 (1981) (arguing that Illinois Brick
does not preempt state indirect purchaser actions).
" See supra notes 108-54 and accompanying text.
7 15 U.S.C. 5 22 (1976) provides for venue wherever the corporate defendant is an in-
habitant, is found, or transacts business. See Hovenkamp, supra note 125.
' Under California law, if all defendants are nonresidents, the plaintiff may sue anywhere
in the state. See CAL. CiV. PROC. CODE 5 395 (West Supp. 1982).
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merce clause on the theory that the state was simply pursuing a policy
consistent with the general federal policy. 9 However, this qualification
might be applied inconsistently; although the general federal policy of
condemning price-fixing is absolutely clear, today there is also a clear
federal policy against permitting damage actions by indirect purchasers."
On the other hand, if state antitrust law in the federal scheme is to
mean anything at all, it must mean that the states are entitled to be dif-
ferent from the federal government, certainly with respect to such con-
troversial issues as the indirect purchaser rule.'6 Federal preemption
liberally invoked is a kind of overkill that is difficult to harmonize with
Congress' desire to maintain a two-tier antitrust enforcement system. '62
Holding that Illinois Brick'6' preempts contrary applications of state anti-
trust law does not mean merely that California's indirect purchasers can-
not use the Cartwright Act to reach price-fixing in Florida. It means that
they will not be able to reach price-fixing in California either, unless the
restraint is so local that it is out of range of Sherman Act preemption.
The Supreme Court thus has been extraordinarily reluctant to find that
state antitrust laws have been preempted by federal law. For example,
in Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland" the Supreme Court considered
a preemption challenge to a state vertical disintegration statute. The
statute provided that no producer or refiner of petroleum products could
operate a retail service station in Maryland. 5 No producers or refiners
were located within the state, so the burden of the statute fell largely
on interests outside the state. In addition, the statute provided that any
temporary price reduction extended by a petroleum supplier to one ser-
vice station in the state must be extended to all stations in the state
uniformly.'66
,59 See, e.g., Standard Oil Co. of Ky. v. Tennessee, 217 U.S. 413, 422 (1910}, cf. California
v. Zook, 336 U.S. 725, 729 (1949). See also Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943), where the
Supreme Court upheld a state program allocating production and marketing of raisins,
even though nearly all the raisins were shipped into other states and the California raisins
subject to the program included nearly all the raisins consumed in the United States. The
Supreme Court held the program valid under the commerce clause because it was consis-
tent with federal policy as manifested in the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act, 7
U.S.C. SS 601-624 (1937). Parker, 317 U.S. at 352-58. Furthermore, it was valid under the
Sherman Act because the framers of the Sherman Act never intended for the antitrust
laws to be used to condemn state regulatory programs that are themselves within the
police power of the states and constitutional under the commerce clause. Parker, 317 U.S.
at 350-52; see also State v. Allied Chem. & Dye Corp., 9 Wis. 2d 290, 101 N.W.2d 133 (1960);
R.E. Spriggs Co. v. Adolph Coors Co., 37 Cal. App. 3d 653, 112 Cal. Rptr. 585 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1974).
16 See Illinois Brick v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977).
161 See sources cited supra note 155.
162 See generally Werden & Balmer, Conflicts Between State Law and the Sherman Act,
44 U. PITT. L. REV. 1 (1982).
16 431 U.S. 720 (1977).
16 437 U.S. 117 (1978).
Exxon Corp., 437 U.S. at 119 (citing MD. ANN. CODE, art. 56, S 157E(b) and (c) (Supp. 1977)).
16 Exxon Corp., 437 U.S. at 120 (citing MD. ANN. CODE, art. 56, § 157E(a)).
[Vol. 58:375
1983] STATE ANTITRUST
Several vertically-integrated oil companies challenged the statute as
being preempted by the Robinson-Patman Act as well as the "general
policy of competition"'' 1 contained in the Sherman Act. The Supreme Court
acknowledged that the act was anti-competitive and perhaps inconsistent
with federal antitrust policy."6 8 It refused, however, to find that any part
of the state statute was preempted by federal law. The Court noted that
the appellants could not show that compliance with the state law would
actually force them to violate the Robinson-Patman Act. 6 9
In responding to several hypotheticals posed by appellants, the Supreme
Court merely noted that "the existence of such potential conflicts is en-
tirely too speculative" to justify preemption. ° The Court noted that
Maryland law condemned certain acts that federal law would permit, but
that is the case with respect to most permissible state regulation which
is concurrent with federal regulation. Further, the Court said, "if an
adverse effect on competition were, in and of itself, enough to render
a state statute invalid, the states' power to engage in economic regula-
tion would be effectively destroyed.1171
It seems clear, today, that the assertion that federal law occupies the
field will not be sufficient to preempt state antitrust lawY.2 The Supreme
,6 Id. at 129.
E xon Corp., 437 U.S. at 133. The statutes' requirement that all temporary price reduc-
tions be spread uniformly to all stations will prevent suppliers from competing vigorously
in highly competitive areas; for the only way they could do so would be to lower their
price to less competitive stations at the same time. Likewise, the vertical disintegration
required by the statute subverts the general federal antitrust policy of maximizing con-
sumer welfare by encouraging efficiency in distribution. See R. BORK, THE ANTITRUST
PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF 280-89 (1978).
6 Exxon Corp., 437 U.S. at 131, nn.21, 22. Preemption analysis of a state statute that
grants damages actions to indirect purchasers would probably survive the same test. Such
a statute does not force anyone to violate federal antitrust law. Exxon Corp., 437 U.S. at
131 (citing Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. S 12 as amended by the Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 13(b)).
17 Exxon Corp., 437 U.S. at 131.
"I Id. at 133.
17 However, other federal statutes have occasionally been held to preempt state antitrust
law. See, e.g., Connell Const. Co. v. Plumbers & Steam Fitters Local Union No. 100, 421
U.S. 616, 635-37 (1975) (national labotr policy as manifested in the National Labor Relations
Act allows some limited application of federal antitrust law to labor activities; however,
NLRA preempts application of state antitrust law); Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 (1972) (af-
firming a decision that the exemption given to baseball under the federal antitrust law,
together with the need for uniformity in the area, mandated preemption of state antitrust
law. Id. at 284-85). For further discussion of the baseball "anomaly." see Rubin, supra note
3, at 687-96; Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 394 U.S. 369 (1969);
Weber v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc. 348 U.S. 468, 473-82 (1955); International Bd. of Teamsters
v. Oliver, 358 U.S. 283, 295-97 (1959). See Partee v. San Diego Chargers Football Co., 194
Cal. Rptr. 367 (Sup. Ct. 1983) (extending baseball preemption to football); Standard Radio
& Television Co. v. Chronicle Pub. Co., 182 Cal. App. 2d 293, 6 Cal. Rptr. 246 (1960) (holding
that California's Cartwright Act was preempted by the Federal Communications Act of
1934). The Standard Radio decision was called into question in Younger v. Jensen, 26 Cal.
3d 397, 161 Cal. Rptr. 905, 912 n.7 (1980). See generally Note, Federal Preemption in Televi-
sion Antitrust, 13 STAN. L. REv. 629 (1961). See sources cited supra note 151 and accompanying
text.
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Court has said that preemption will be found only upon showing clear
evidence of actual conflict, which in turn requires that compliance with
the state law would force the defendant to disobey the federal law.'
There has also not yet been a case in which an indirect purchaser has
recovered damages under state law from a defendant who has already
been forced under federal law-to disgorge the full amount of the over-
charge to a direct purchaser."4 Such an application of state antitrust law
would force the defendant to pay the multiple damages that the Supreme
Court decided in Illinois Brick were not consistent with federal antitrust
policy. 5 When faced with such a case, the courts ought to consider
carefully what it means to say that federal and state antitrust are designed
to reinforce and supplement each other.'
"I See Exxon Corp. 437 U.S. at 130. Even in that case, the state action exemption from
the antitrust laws would permit a state statute to require a person to violate the federal
antitrust laws, provided that the statute manifested a policy against competition that was
"clearly articulated" and "affirmatively expressed," and the activity was "actively super-
vised" by the state itself. See also California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum,
Inc., 445 U.S. 97 (1980); Morgan v. Division of Liquor Control, 664 F.2d 353 (2nd Cir. 1981).
17 However, the Fifth Circuit has recently approved a settlement that included cash
payouts to both direct purchasers asserting federal claims and indirect purchasers assert-
ing pendent state law claims. See In re Chicken Antitrust Litig., 669 F.2d 228, 238-39 (5th
Cir. 1982). See also, Union Carbide Corp. v. Superior Court, 183 Cal. Rptr. 318 (1982), in
which a California court of appeal held that in a Cartwright suit brought by indirect pur-
chasers, known direct purchasers who had already filed a federal action were indispen-
sable parties. The court held that the total treble-damage liability to which the defendants
were exposed amounted to a "common fund," and that all plaintiffs having a stake in that
fund must be joined if feasible to prevent duplicative recovery or exhaustion of the fund
by one class of claimants. The court did not indicate how the "fund" should be divided
if all direct and indirect purchasers were actually joined and prevailed. Presumably, under
federal law the direct purchasers would be entitled to the entire "fund," regardless of
the presence of the indirect purchasers. In short, merely joining direct and indirect pur-
chasers into a single action does not solve the basic problem of Illinois Brick and indirect
purchaser actions under state antitrust laws. "Only a ruling that federal law preempts
the state law action by indirect purchasers would avoid" the problem of conflicting damages
claims, the court concluded. Union Carbide Corp., 183 Cal. Rptr. at 323. In Alexander v.
Cambridge-Lee Industries, Inc., 44 ANTITRUST TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) 974 (N.D. Cal April
21, 1983) the court held that the "common fund" doctrine did not justify removal of a state
indirect purchaser claims to federal court, because indirect purchasers have no right under
federal law "to share in any federal common fund recovery."
175 Illinois Brick, 431 U.S. at 730-31.
175 There is at least a possibility that the due process clause prevents a court from assessing
damages against someone who has already paid out the full amount of the damages to
a different plaintiff; that is, to award B damages for injuries when A has already been
compensated for the injuries of both A and B. See Russo & Dubin v. Allied Maintenance
Corp., 95 Misc. 2d 344, 407 N.Y.S.2d 617 (1978) where the court refused to permit indirect
purchasers to sue for damages under New York's Donnelly Act. To permit such an action,
reasoned the court, "would create serious conflict between enforcement of State and Federal
antitrust laws which would subject defendants to multiple liability in derogation of due
process." 95 Misc. 2d at 347-48, 407 N.Y.S.2d at 620. This language was quoted with ap-
parent approval by the federal district court in Wiring Device Antitrust Litig., 498 F. Supp.
79, 87 (E.D.N.Y. 1980). The New York state court in Russo & Dubin did not explain why
such a duplicative recovery might violate the due process clause, nor did it cite any authority.
However, it noted that at the time an action based on the same set of facts was being
pursued by direct purchasers under federal law; so the risk of eventual duplicative awards
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CONSOLIDATED FEDERAL LITIGATION AND
SIMULTANEOUS STATE CLAIMS
The federal statute authorizing consolidation and transfer of pretrial
proceedings in complex multidistrict litigation"7 has proved especially
useful in large, multi-party federal antitrust cases." Once there has been
a finding, frequently by a federal grand jury or a federal court in a govern-
ment prosecution, that an antitrust violation has occurred, plaintiffs filing
actions under the same set of operative facts in all parts of the country
may have their claims consolidated and transferred to a single federal
judge for pretrial proceedings." 9 The savings in federal judicial time and
in costs and effort to the parties can be enormous. 11
As a general rule, a party cannot resist consolidation and transfer of
its claim if the claim qualifies for transfer under the statute." Defen-
dants generally benefit from consolidation and transfer of antitrust cases
more than plantiffs do;" the marginal cost to an antitrust defendant. of
having to litigate the same issues in a second forum can be high. For
this reason, plaintiffs sometimes try to force settlement by maintaining
a separate action that cannot be consolidated and transferred with the
others even though the operative facts are the same." If the claims in
such a separate nuisance action are small but litigation costs are high,
the defendants will have a strong incentive to settle the separate action."
was substantial. See Shelter Realty Corp. v. Allied Maintenance Corp., 442 F. Supp. 1087
(S.D.N.Y. 1977). But see Connecticut v. Levi Strauss & Co., 471 F. Supp. 363, 368 (D. Conn.
1979); Note, Indirect Purchaser Suits Under State Antitrust Laws: A Detour Around the
Illinois Brick Wall, supra note 11, at 211-18.
28 U.S.C. S 1407 (1976).
For a history and general description of the statute, see 15 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER
& E. COOPER. FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE S 3861 (1976), Howard, A Guide to Section
1407 and Multidistrit Litigation, 75 F.R.D. 577 (1977), and Note, Consolidation and Transfer
in the Federal Courts: 28 U.S.C., Section 1407 in Light of Rule 42(a) and 28 U.S.C. Section
1404(a), 22 HASTINGS L.J. 1289 (1971).
" FED. R. Civ. P. 42(a).
" See, e.g., In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litig., 447 F. Supp. 468 (J.P.M.D.L.
1978); see generally sources cited supra note 178.
" In re Swine Flue Immunization Prods. Liab. Litig., 464 F. Supp. 949 (J.P.M.D.L. 1979);
In re Viatron Computer Sys. Corp. Secs. Litig., 462 F. Supp. 382 (J.P.M.D.L. 1978); In re
Asbestos & Asbestos Insulation Material Prod. Liab. Litig., 431 F. Supp. 906 (J.P.M.D.L.
1977); In re Holiday Magic Sees. & Antitrust Litig., 372 F. Supp. 1167 (J.P.M.D.L. 1974);
In re Air Crash Disaster at Toronto Int'l Airport, 346 F. Supp. 533 (J.P.M.D.L. 1972).
1' Most consolidated antitrust cases involve a common set of defendants but many dif-
ferent plaintiffs filing different actions. In such cases, the greatest beneficiary of consolidated
litigation is the defendants. The exception is a group of antitrust actions involving many
defendants but a single plaintiff. See In re Uranium Indus. Antitrust Litig., 458 F. Supp.
1223 (J.P.M.D.L. 1978).
" In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litig, 659 F.2d 1332 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied,
(1982); In re Wiring Device Antitrust Litig., 498 F. Supp. 79 (E.D.N.Y. 1980); California
v. California & Hawaiian Sugar Co., MDL 201, 588 F.2d 1270 (9th Cir. 1978).
I" See, e.g., In re Wiring Device Antitrust Litig., 498 F. Supp. 79 (E.D.N.Y. 1980) (where
the plaintiffs claims were for under $10,000).
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One way that plaintiffs can avoid consolidation and transfer is by
avoiding the federal court system altogether.'5 In several recent cases,
plaintiffs have filed antitrust claims in state court under state law iden-
tical to federal claims against the same defendants, which had already
been consolidated and transferred. 88 Some of these state filings can be
characterized as nothing more than blatant attempts to avoid transfer
and to force the defendant to pay the costs of discovery and pre-trial
procedures twice. On the other hand, some classes of plaintiffs may have
claims that can be recognized only under state law. Since the Supreme
Court's decision in Illinois Brick, for example, indirect purchasers cannot
bring certain kinds of antitrust damages actions under federal law."
The indirect purchaser who wants recovery for antitrust damages
caused by a cartel has no choice but to bring his claim under state law,"'
but such a plaintiff need not necessarily file in state court. If diversity
exists, the plaintiff may file in federal court and its claim can be trans-
ferred and-consolidated with the other multidistrict federal claims. Addi-
tionally, a plaintiff with a cause of action under federal antitrust law could
attach a state cause of action arising from the same operative facts under
the federal court's pendent jurisdiction. 89 In such a situation, however,
if an indirect purchaser brought an action for damages under both federal
and state antitrust law, both actions would probably be dismissed. It would
likely appear either on the face of the complaint or else at a very early
stage in the proceedings that the plaintiff had no damages action under
federal law, and therefore that the state cause of action was merely riding
on the improper federal cause of action."
The federal courts, on the other hand, have consistently held that
Illinois Brick does not preclude an action for an injunction.19' An indirect
1I In order to avoid consolidation and transfer, one must not only bring an action in
state court, but it must be brought under circumstances that it cannot be removed to federal
court. Once a case is in federal court, whether by removal or by original action, it can
be consolidated with other cases, so long as it qualifies under 28 U.S.C. S 1407. See In
re Professional Hockey Antitrust Litig., 369 F. Supp. 1117 (J.P.M.D.L. 1974); In re Antibiotic
Drugs, 299 F. Supp. 1403 (J.P.M.D.L. 1969).
" See cases cited supra note 183.
"' Illinois Brick v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977). At least five states have amended their
laws expressly to give indirect purchasers the right to sue for damages. See Note, Indirect
Purchaser Suits Under State Antitrust Laws: A Detour Around the Illinois Brick Wall, supra
note 11.
"' Unless he falls within one of the exceptions under federal law, such as the exception
for pre-existing, fixed quantity, fixed cost contracts. See Illinois Brick v. Illinois, 431 U.S.
at 732 n.12 (1977); In re Beef Industry Antitrust Litig., 600 F.2d 1148, 1163-67 (5th Cir. 1979).
18 See Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528 (1974, UMW v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966).
190 See UMW v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 726 (1966) (suggesting that pendent jurisdiction should
be declined if the federal claim to which it is pendent is dismissed before trial); By-Prod
Corp. v. Armen-Berry Co., 668 F.2d 956, 962 (7th Cir. 1982).
191 See Mid-West Paper Prods. Co. v. Continental Group, Inc., 596 F.2d 573 (3rd Cir. 1979);
In re Beef Ind. Antitrust Litig., 600 F.2d 1148 (5th Cir. 1979); International Ass'n of Machinists
v. OPEC, 477 F. Supp. 553 (C.D. Cal. 1979), affjd, 649 F.2d 1354 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied,
454 U.S. 1163 (1982).
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purchaser could bring an action under federal antitrust law seeking an
injunction against the antitrust violation and attach a state antitrust claim
seeking damages under a state antitrust statute that permits indirect pur-
chaser damages actions. In that case, the indirect purchaser's state law
claim could be transferred and consolidated with other federal claims.'92
It is possible, however, that some plaintiffs will ask for certain relief
that can be given to them only if their actions are maintained in a state
court. For example, a California court of appeals has recently held that
California law permits "fluid" or cy pres recoveries in antitrust class
actions.19 Although the availability of fluid recovery in federal class ac-
tions has not been finally determined,'M federal courts have been generally
hostile toward fluid recovery mechanisms in class action cases.19 Further-
more, once a claim, whether federal or state, has entered the federal
courts, class action issues will likely be determined under federal and
not under state law.' Thus it is likely that even if a California class were
19 See In re Chicken Antitrust Litig., 669 F.2d 228 (5th Cir. 1982). In In re Chicken, the
court approved a class action settlement that included payouts to indirect purchasers. The
Fifth Circuit held that since indirect purchasers could, under Fifth Circuit doctrine, id.
at 236 (citing In re Beef Indus. Antitrust Litig., 600 F.2d 1148, 1167 (5th Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 905 (1980)), maintain an action for an injunction under the federal antitrust
laws, their pendent state claims were properly before the court. Id. at 237. Furthermore,
the Fifth Circuit concluded, the federal court approving the settlement agreement could
justifiably consider both state and federal claims. Id. at 240.
"I Bruno v. Superior Court, 127 Cal. App. 3d 120,179 Cal. Rptr. 342 (1981). In fluid recovery
mechanisms, damages are not paid out to the class members in direct proportion to their
injuries. Rather, the damages are paid to some institution to be used in a way that would
benefit the plaintiff class, or else the damages are assessed as future price reductions by
the defendants that will offset the injury caused by the alleged violation. Additionally,
some fluid recovery judgments provide for damages to be paid as a penalty into the state
treasury. See generally Note, An Economic Analysis of Fluid Class Recovery Mechanisms,
45 STAN. L. REV. 173 (1981); Note, Damage Distribution in ClassActions: The CyPresRemedy
39 U. CHi. L. REv. 448 (1972).
See Boeing v. Van Gemert, 444 U.S. 472, 480 n.6 (1980).
193 Windham v. American Brands, Inc. 565 F.2d 59 (4th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S.
968 (1978); In re Hotel Telephone Charges, 500 F.2d 86, 90 (9th Cir. 1974); Eisen v. Carlisle
& Jacquelin, 479 F.2d 1005, 1017-18 (2d Cir. 1973), vacated on other grounds, 417 U.S. 156
(1974). But see Simer v. Rios, 661 F.2d 655,676 (7th Cir. 1981) ("a careful case-by-case analysis
of use of the fluid recovery mechanism is the better approach"). The availability of fluid
recovery can be an important factor in determining manageability of the class suit. As
a result, the option of fluid recovery can make a class action easier to certify. See Advisory
Committee's Note to Proposed Rule 23, 29 F.R.D. 98, 102-04 (1966); Comment, The Califor-
nia State Courts and Consumer Class Actions for Antitrust Violations, 33 HASTINGS L.J.
689, 700 (1982).
1" Whether a class action under state law would be permitted a fluid recovery in federal
court, if the fluid recovery would be available in state court, is a difficult issue. As a general
matter federal law determines procedure in all federal class actions, whether under federal
law or state. See Minnesota v. U.S. Steel Corp., 44 F.R.D. 559, 568 (D. Minn. 1968). In In
re Hotel Telephone Charges, 500 F.2d 86 (9th Cir. 1974), the court found that to construe
Federal Rule 23 as authorizing fluid recoveries would effectively enlarge or modify a substan-
tive right under the antitrust laws, in violation of the Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. S 2072 (1976).
Manifestly, permitting fluid recovery in an antitrust action under state antitrust law, where
the state law has already been interpreted as authorizing fluid recovery in state court,
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entitled to a fluid recovery in a Cartwright Act case, the fluid recovery
would be unavailable if that same state law action were heard in federal
court. The only way the plaintiff class could have the benefit of such a
method of recovery would be if the action remained in state court.
In addition to permitting fluid recovery, the California law of class ac-
tions can be more favorable to plaintiffs than under federal rule 23.1"
This is particularly true with respect to federal class actions brought under
rule 23(b)(3), as most antitrust class actions are. For example, the Supreme
Court has held that individual notice must be given to identifiable
members of classes formulated under rule 23(b)(3). 11 However, California
permits notice by publication in certain instances. '99 Likewise, in a federal
rule 23(b)(3) class action the cost of sending notice must be borne by the
plaintiff,0 a factor which frequently renders a federal class action
impracticable. 0 ' However, under California law the trial judge may order
the defendant to share in notice costs or even to pay the full cost.0 2 In
these instances, if such a lawsuit brought under California antitrust law
were removed to federal court, rule 23 would likely govern and the plain-
tiff class would lose these state-created advantages. 3
From the federal standpoint, state antitrust filings contemporaneous
with multidistrict federal antitrust litigation raise several problems of
case administration that are antagonistic to the original purpose behind
28 U.S.C. section 1407. That statute was designed to force the consolida-
tion and transfer of multiple actions based on common operative facts
to a single district for pretrial proceedings. Although the presence of a
renegade state claim will not defeat the federal policy of reducing ex-
cessive strain on the federal court system, it can impose a substantial
would not be enlarging a substantive right. On the other hand, there is a strong interest
in interpreting the federal rules uniformly, and as a general matter the federal courts have
not permitted fluid recoveries in federal class actions. See generally 19 C. WRIGHT. A.
MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE S 4509 (1982).
I See, e.g., Rosack v. Volvo Corp. of Amer. 131 Cal. App. 3d 741, 182 Cal. Rptr. 800
(1982) (permitting a state law resale price maintenance claim to proceed as a class action,
even though the class members would have to prove the fact of injury individually and
therefore could not show common question "predominance," as required for federal cer-
tification under Rule 23(b)(3)). See Hovenkamp, Tying Arrangements and Class Actions, 36
VAND. L. REV. 213, 216-18 (1983).
... Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 173-77 (1974).
'" See Cartt v. Superior Court, 50 Cal. Ct. App. 3d 960, 969-70, 124 Cal. Rptr. 376, 382-83
(1975).
Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 177 (1974).
' Id. at 167; see also In re Hotel Tel. Charges, 500 F.2d 86 (9th Cir. 1974); Considine
v. Park Nat'l Bank, 64 F.R.D. 646, 648 (E.D. Tenn. 1974).
Civil Service Employees Liab. Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 22 Cal. 3d 363, 376, 584
P.2d 497, 506, 149 Cal. Rptr. 360, 369 (1978); Roth v. Dept. of Veteran Affairs, 110 Cal.
App. 3d 622, 167 Cal. Rptr. 552 (1980).
See generally Comment, The California State Courts and Consumer Class Actions for
Antitrust Violations, 33 HASTINGS L.J. 689 (1982).
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burden on the defendant, who thereby loses the advantage of being able
to litigate against all parties in a single proceeding."4
The Simultaneous Filing Problem: The "Artftl Pleading"
Doctrine and Removal of State Antitrust Complaints
Thus far the federal courts hearing consolidated antitrust complaints
have not found an adequate way to deal with concurrent state filings.
For example, Three J Farms Inc. v. Alton Box Board Co."5 arose out of
the corrugated container price-fixing litigation. In 1977, the Judicial Panel
on Multidistrict Litigation transferred thirty-seven private actions aris-
ing out of the same conspiracy to the southern district of Texas. 06
Thereafter, civil actions arising out of the same operative facts were con-
tinually tranferred to Texas.
In order to avoid transfer, the plaintiffs in Three J Farms filed their
complaint in state court under the antitrust law of South Carolina.0 The
plaintiffs alleged that they wanted to use the South Carolina statute
because it permitted successful plaintiffs to recover the full purchase price
rather than three times the overcharge as the Sherman Act provides. '
In any case, the complaint filed in the South Carolina state court was
identical to the unified and consolidated complaint adopted by the plain-
tiffs in the federal consolidated litigation in Texas. Furthermore, the plain-
tiffs in Three JFarms requested discovery of all documents that the defen-
dants had produced in the Texas consolidated federal litigation. By that
time, the consolidated discovery process had generated 1.5 million
documents. This demand, as the federal district court of South Carolina
Perhaps 28 U.S.C. § 1407 does not manifest a federal interest in preventing duplicative
litigation of claims in state courts. Indeed, nothing in the statute indicates such a concern.
On the other hand, there is undoubtedly a federal interest-recognized in the United States
Constitution-in protecting persons (not court systems) from duplicative litigation in any
court system. The doctrine of res judicata, for example, recognizes a federal interest in
preventing duplicative litigation in state courts as well as federal. See Degnan, Federalized
Res Judicata, 85 YALE L.J. 741 (1976). That duty is especially important here, because an
early judgment in the state court could preclude relitigation of certain issues in the
multidistrict federal proceeding. Under the criteria established for offensive collateral estop-
pel in Parklane Hosiery v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322 (1979), the defendant in the separately-filed
state antitrust case who is also a defendant in the federal multidistrict litigation would
be forced to litigate fully and fiercely all issues that might be used against it in the federal
proceeding. In such a case the state-law defendant would have actual knowledge that issues
determined against it in the state proceeding might be used by a different plaintiff in the
subsequent federal trial. See the discussion of Parklane Hosiery infra text accompanying
notes 320-30.
" 1979-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 62,423 (D.S.C. 1978), rev'd on other grounds, 609 F.2d 112
(4th Cir. 1979), cert denied, 445 U.S. 911 (1980).
= See In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litig., 441 F. Supp. 921 (J.P.M.D.L. 1977).
n S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-3-10 (Law. Co-op. 1976).
2s Three J Farms, 1979-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 62,423, at 76,548.
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noted, "would destroy the effectiveness of the Judicial Panel on
Multidistrict Litigation ....",19
The district court found several reasons why the state cause of action
had been properly removed to federal court and could therefore be
transferred. First, the judge held that the plaintiffs state law complaint
really stated a cause of action under the Sherman Act, in spite of the
fact that the complaint asserted that it "contain[ed] no charges of federal
law violations.""21 The logic of that holding is questionable. The complaint
filed in state court referred to state and not federal law. However, the
judge was obviously influenced by the fact that the state law complaint
lifted from the unified federal complaint "entire paragraphs without any
change of language or even punctuation." '
Second, the judge decided that the state complaint probably failed to
state a cause of action under the South Carolina antitrust law because
that law "was limited many years ago to exclude activities having an ef-
fect upon interstate commerce." '212 Thus, he concluded, "any claim for
damages resulting from the importation or the sale of imported corrugated
containers is not a South Carolina claim, but purely a federal claim."2 '3
That argument supports dismissal of the complaint by the state judge
in the original proceeding for failure to state a cause of action under state
law, but does not support removal to a federal court. Although the federal
courts have exclusive jurisdiction of actions brought under federal anti-
trust law, 4 if a state court has no jurisdiction over a cause of action,
the claim cannot be removed to the federal court but must be dismissed.21 5
A claim filed in a state court alleging a cause of action under the federal
antitrust laws could therefore not be removed to the federal court.1 '
I Id. The district judge inferred that the plaintiff's purpose was "to harass the defen-
dants by requiring them to fight on two fronts, produce two sets of documents, endure
discovery on the same issues in courts 1,500 miles apart, all in the hope of obtaining a
settlement from the defendants out of economic necessity ...." Id. at 76,550.
21' Three J Farms, 1979-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 62,423, at 76,550.
211 Id.
212 Id. (citing State v. Virginia-Carolina Chem. Co., 71 S.C. 544, 51 S.E. 555 (1905)).
213 Three J Farms, 1979-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 62,423, at 76,550.
214 General Inv. Co. v. Lake Shore & M.S. Ry, 260 U.S. 261, 287 (1922); Blumenenstock
Bros. Advertising Agency v. Curtis Publishing Co., 252 U.S. 436, 440 (1920); Vaugh & Co.
v. Saul, 143 Ga. App. 74, 86, 237 S.E.2d 622, 631 (1977).
215 Lambert Run Coal Co. v. B&O R.R., 258 U.S. 377 (1922); People v. Kerr-McGee Chem.
Corp., 677 F.2d 571 (7th Cir. 1982); see C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, supra note 196,
at S 3721.
216 General Inv. Co. v. Lake Shore & M.S. Ry., 260 U.S. 261 (1922); State of Washington
v. American League of Professional Baseball Clubs, 460 F.2d 654 (9th Cir. 1972). See In
re Sugar Antitrust Litig., 588 F.2d 1270, 1272 n.4 (9th Cir. 1978); In In re Wiring Device
Antitrust Litig., 498 F. Supp. 79 (E.D.N.Y. 1980), the plaintiff filed under South Carolina
law against the same defendants and under the same operative facts as thirty federal cases
that had been consolidated by the Panel. In re Wiring Device Antitrust Litig., 444 F. Supp.
1349 (J.P.M.D.L. 1978). There was diversity between the parties but the plaintiff's ad dam-
num stated less than the $10,000 jurisdictional minimum for diversity actions. Id. at 81.
However, the federal court assumed that the plaintiffs would request attorney's fees in
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The circuit courts have generally overruled district courts finding
federal causes of action in complaints which attempted to plead state
causes of action.1 17 Antitrust liability is created by two overlapping and
in some cases virtually congruent bodies of substantive law. A founda-
tion of American federalism is that in such situations an aggrieved party
can seek its protection from either the federal or the state government.
Furthermore, implicit in the two-tier antitrust enforcement scheme is the
plaintiff's right to opt for state law, particularly if state substantive or
procedural law makes it to the plaintiff's advantage to do so.
excess of $10,000 in the state action, even though no South Carolina statute authorized
attorneys' fees to successful plaintiffs in antitrust cases. Id. at 81-82. The court concluded
that more than $10,000 was "potentially" in controversy, and refused to remand. Id. at 82.
The district court also held that although the plaintiff had pled exclusively under state
antitrust law, a federal antitrust question was nevertheless "integral to its claims." Id.
at 82. The court concluded that since the transactions giving rise to the cause of action
were interstate, and since the South Carolina antitrust act had been interpreted as not
reaching "interstate commerce of any kind," the complaint failed to assert a cause of ac-
tion under state law. Id. at 83. From that premise the judge concluded that the plaintiffs'
complaint did state a cause of action under the federal antitrust laws, in spite of the fact
that it purported not to do so. Id. at 83.
Having granted removal on two different and inconsistent grounds-first, that there
was a sufficient amount in controversy for federal diversity jurisdiction, so removal of
the state claim was proper; secondly, that there was no state claim at all, because it was
really a federal claim in disguise-the court assumed that the case as it had been removed
to the federal court contained both state and federal claims and entertained a motion to
dismiss on the merits. Dismissing the state claim was relatively easy, since the state anti-
trust law did not reach transactions in interstate commerce. Id. at 84. Additionally, the
plaintiffs were indirect purchasers and the court concluded that the South Carolina courts
would probably construe the South Carolina statute to permit recovery only by direct pur-
chasers. Id. at 85-86. Likewise, the court concluded that because the plaintiff was an in-
direct purchaser, it had no claim under federal law. Id. at 86-88.
In the Three J Farms litigation, see supra text accompanying notes 205-13, the federal
district judge held as an alternative ground for removal that, although there was not suffi-
cient diversity to support removal, the plaintiffs had in fact included a party plaintiff "in
an attempt to defeat federal court jurisdiction." Three J Farms, 1979-1 Trade Cas. (CCH)
62,423, at 76,551.
"I But see Federated Dep't Stores, Inc. v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394 (1981) where the Supreme
Court acknowledged that under certain circumstances state antitrust claims could be so
"federal in nature" that they would support removal. Id. at 397 n.2 (quoting C. WRIGHT,
A. MILLER & E. COOPER, supra note 178 S 3722, at 564-66, courts "will not permit plaintiff
to use artful pleading to close off defendant's right to a federal forum ... [and] occasionally
the removal court will seek to determine whether the real nature of the claim is federal,
regardless of plaintiffs characterization.") The Supreme Court therefore left undisturbed
the finding of the district court, affirmed by the Ninth Circuit, that a plaintiff cannot avoid
removal by "artfully" casting "essentially federal law claims" as state law claims. Id. at
397 n.2. Justice Rehnquist did not deal with the question of the derivative nature of removal
jurisdiction. Perhaps this was because he viewed the state-filed claim not as an artfully
pled federal antitrust claim, but rather as some sort of hybrid, relying on state law but
invoking sufficient federal interests to support federal question removal. Justice Rehn-
quist did not say that the plaintiff's state complaint was in fact a federal complaint; rather,
he said that "some of the [state filed] claims had a sufficient federal character to support
removal." Id. at 397 n.2. Although the precise meaning of that statement is not clear, it
seems that such a "hybrid" claim is a legal novelty. See Iowa v. Binney & Smith, 42 ANTI-
TRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) 1274 (S.D. Iowa 1982).
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California v. California & Hawaiian Sugar Co."8 involved a separate
filing situation much like the ones in the container and wiring device litiga-
tions. The state of California and a private plaintiff representing a class
of consumers brought an action under the Cartwright Act alleging price
fixing in the sugar industry. At the time approximately 100 separate ac-
tions under federal antitrust law involving several hundred plaintiffs and
fourteen defendants had been consolidated for pretrial proceedings. 19 The
defendants had removed the state-filed case to federal court for consolida-
tion with the others. The district court subsequently denied the plain-
tiffs' motion to remand and held that although the complaint asserted
only state law claims, it really started a cause of action under federal
antitrust law. In fact, much of the language of the state law complaints
was copied verbatim from U.S. criminal indictments alleging violations
of federal antitrust law.10
The rationale for the district court's ruling strikes at the heart of the
two-level antitrust enforcement scheme. For example, before filing the
state law claims, the state of California had filed a federal action based
on the same operative facts and sought certification of a consumer class
and a public entity class. The federal district court had denied certifica-
tion of the consumer class because it was composed largely of indirect
purchasers.22" ' Thus, the Ninth Circuit vacated the district court's refusal
to remand and concluded that the lower court's holding was tantamount
to a dismissal of their cause of action under the rule of Illinois Brick.
The Ninth Circuit was uncertain, however, whether the California courts
would construe the Cartwright Act to bar damages to an indirect
purchaser. 2 The Ninth Circuit concluded that "to deny remand under
these extraordinary circumstances amounts to federal preemption of state
antitrust law by judicial act where it is conceded that there is no con-
gressional preemption.""3
The Ninth Circuit's answer to the problem of concurrent state and
federal filings was a principled solution consistent with the preservation
of federalism and the two-level antitrust system. Implicit in the notion
218 588 F.2d 1270 (9th Cir. 1978). For the consolidated federal litigation, see In re Sugar
Industry Antitrust Litig., 433 F. Supp. 1122 (J.P.M.D.L. 1977). For a discussion of the prob-
lem of simultaneous filings, see generally Note, Simultaneous Filing of State and Federal
Antitrust Actions: A Jurisdictional Dilemma, 41 U. PITT. L. REV. 629 (1980).
219 California & Hawaiian Sugar, 588 F.2d at 1271.
1 Id. at 1272.
11 Id. at 1271. The district court issued that order before Illinois Brick was decided.
See California & Hawaiian Sugar, 588 F.2d at 1272-73.
1 The Ninth Circuit's opinion was written before the California legislature amended
the Cartwright Act to grant damages actions to indirect purchasers. California & Hawaiian
Sugar, 588 F.2d at 1273 n.6.
California & Hawaiian Sugar, 588 F.2d at 1273. The court conceded, however, that
denying removal and permitting simultaneous federal and state claims to proceed may
"pose grave problems in the management of litigation." Id. at 1273.
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that Congress has sought to preserve dual antitrust enforcement is a
recognition that there are some occasions when a plaintiff would be bet-
ter off bringing a case in state court under state law than under federal
law. More fundamentally, the two-tier enforcement mechanism impliedly
admits that sometimes state courts will recognize and value different in-
terests than the federal courts. As a result, state law will sometimes be
substantively different from federal law. Nowhere has Congress mandated
that state antitrust law is permissible only when it is identical with federal
law, even though it may be presumed that fundamental inconsistences
between state and federal law will be resolved in favor of federal law. 4
The system of federalism itself indicates the values that clearly need to
be protected: a plaintiff's interest in state antitrust is strongest when
the state court can provide a kind of relief that the federal court cannot.
In short, the federal system can be both used and abused-and the federal
courts have a legitimate interest in protecting federal defendants and
the federal court system from the abuses.
The issues at stake in the conflict between state and federal antitrust
law are well illustrated by the recent debate between Justices Rehnquist
and Brennan in Federated Department Stores v. Moitie. 5 In 1976, the
Moities, retail purchasers, filed a Sherman Act claim in the northern
district of California alleging that the defendant department stores had
fixed the retail price of women's clothing. At that time Reiter v. Sonotonea
had not yet been decided by the Supreme Court. In Reiter, the Court
held that retail purchasers who are victims of price-fixing are injured
in their "business or property"' for the purposes of private antitrust
actions in federal court.
The district court in Moitie took the opposite position and held that
the Moities lacked standing.' Other plaintiffs in the same action appealed.
The Moities, however, filed a similar complaint based on the same
operative facts under California's Cartwright Act and hoped that the
California courts would interpret the "business or property" clause of
the private action provision of the California antitrust law 9 differently.
The defendants promptly removed the action to federal court arguing
that the state complaint actually stated a federal cause of action. The
defendants then moved for dismissal on the grounds that the earlier
221 But see supra text accompanying notes 48-76.
= 452 U.S. 394 (1981).
21 442 U.S. 330 (1979).
- 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976).
2'3 Weinberg v. Federated Dep't Stores, 426 F. Supp. 880, 885 (N.D. Cal. 1977), rev'd sub
nom. Moitie v. Federated Dep't Stores, 611 F.2d 1267 (9th Cir. 1980), rev'd and remanded,
452 U.S. 394 (1981).
CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE 5 16750 (West 1981) provides: "Any person who is injured in
his business or property by reason of anything forbidden or declared unlawful by this chapter,
may sue therefore . . . to recover three times the damages sustained .... "
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federal decision was res judicata as to the subsequent state filed claim.
The Federal Court of the Northern District of California held that the
state filed action was properly removed because although "artfully couched
in terms of state law," the state complaint was "in many respects iden-
tical" to the prior federal complaint.n The Moities appealed to the Ninth
Circuit."' Meanwhile, the United States Supreme Court decided Reiter
v. Sonotone. 2
The issue before the United States Supreme Court in Moitie was simply
whether the first federal claim which incorrectly stated federal law was
res judicata with respect to the subsequently filed state claim. The
Supreme Court held that it was. Justice Rehnquist, speaking for the ma-
jority, left undisturbed a lower court fact finding that the state law claim
asserted by the Moities was in reality an "artfully" pleaded federal claim."'
Having accepted that conclusion, the Supreme Court's decision was in-
evitable. The original dismissal of the Moitie's federal antitrust action
was res judicata as to any subsequent action between the same parties
based on the same operative facts and asserted under the same body of
law, even though the originally dismissed action might be later overrul-
ed in a different case."
Justice Brennan dissented vigorously, although he agreed that the
federal judgment must ultimately bar the Cartwright Act claim. However,
Justice Brennan attacked the Ninth Circuit's holding that the Moitie's
state antitrust claim was in reality an "artfully pleaded" federal claim.
When a plaintiffs claim may be "brought under either federal or state
law, the plaintiff is normally free to ignore the federal question and rest
his claim solely on the state ground. '' s
m Moite, 452 U.S. at 396.
21' The Ninth Circuit decided that the state law complaint did in fact state a federal
claim, but also held that "public policy and simple justice" mandated that res judicata not
apply as between the initial federal dismissal and the subsequently filed state law claim
since the federal dismissal had been reversed in favor of the appealing parties. Moitie,
611 F.2d at 1269-70.
See supra note 226.
Moitie, 452 U.S. at 397 n.2.
Id. at 398 (citing Angel v. Bullington, 330 U.S. 183, 187 (1947); Chocot County Drainage
Dist. v. Baxter State Bank, 308 U.S. 371 (1940;, Baltimore S.S. Co. v. Phillips, 274 U.S.
316, 325 (1927); Wilson's Ex'r v. Deer, 121 U.S. 525, 534 (1887)).
In a concurring opinion Justice Blackmun, 452 U.S. at 402 (Blackmun, J., concurring)
(joined by Marshall, J.) also concluded that the subsequent state claim was barred by the
doctrine of res judicata. However, Justice Blackmun's decision was based on a different
rationale. Justice Blackmun argued that res judicata applies not only to all claims actually
raised in the first case but also to all claims that could have been raised. Since the Moities
could have asserted the state law claim together with the federal law claim in the original
action under the court's pendent jurisdiction, the "respondents were obligated to plead
[the state law] claims [in the first action] if they wished to preserve them." 452 U.S. at 404.
' Moitie, 452 U.S. at 407 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Any other rule would emasculate
state antitrust law:
So long as States retain authority to legislate in subject areas in which Con-
gress has legislated without preempting the field, and so long as state courts
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The "artful pleading" doctrine used by the Ninth Circuit and affirmed
by the Supreme Court majority undercuts state authority, argued Justice
Brennan, unless it is limited to those instances where federal law has
preempted state law.' The obligation of the federal court is to "scrutinize
the complaint in the removed case to determine whether the action, though
ostensibly grounded solely on state law, is actually grounded on a claim
in which federal law is the exclusive authority." 7
Although the general principle of res judicata mandated the result
reached by the court in Moitie, the majority's rationale for that conclusion
is antagonistic to the intent of Congress to permit states to have their
own antitrust laws. For example, if the Supreme Court had decided that
consumers do not have standing under federal antitrust law, then any
attempt by a consumer to obtain a contrary ruling under state law could
be precluded by the "artfully pleaded" doctrine. This rule as interpreted
by the majority in Moitie goes too far. The simple fact is that the Moities
went into state court not merely to avoid a federal forum, but to attempt
to benefit from a state law remedy that the district court held federal
law does not provide.
Justice Brennan's argument, on the other hand, that the "artful pleaded"
doctrine should be restricted to those instances when the state claim has
been preempted by federal law is too narrow. The appropriate question
in the artful pleaded cases is not whether federal law has preempted all
state law in a particular area, but whether the plaintiff is relying on state
law in order to obtain a particular state remedy that federal law does
not grant or whether the plaintiff in state court is seeking the same
remedy that the federal law provides but is merely seeking to avoid the
federal forum. This analysis should illuminate the issues raised by the
separate filing cases.2
The separate filing cases involve two sharply conflicting values. On the
one hand, there is a strong federal and state interest in preventing ex-
cessive litigation of complex issues. When massive antitrust litigation,
such as the corrugated paper action,"9 has been consolidated into a giant
remain the preferred forum for interpretation and enforcement of state law,
plaintiffs must be permitted to proceed in state court under state law. It would
do violence to state autonomy were defendants able to remove state claims
to federal court merely because the plaintiff could have asserted a federal claim
based on the same set of facts underlying his state claim.
Id. In Salveson v. Western States Bankcard Ass'n, 525 F. Supp. 566, 577 (N.D. Cal. 1981),
the district court distinguished Moitie and limited it to its facts by holding that a state
antitrust filing would meet the standards of an artfully pleaded federal complaint "only
when the plaintiff by his conduct, either by filing originally in federal court or by acceding
to federal jurisdiction after removal, has made his claim a federal one." See also Highes
Const. Co. v. Rheem Mfg., 487 F. Supp. 345 (NJ). Miss. 1980).
Moitie, 452 U.S. at 407-08 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Id. at 408 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
See supra notes 177-204 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 205-17 and accompanying text.
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pre-trial effort involving hundreds of parties and millions of documents,
both the federal system and the states have a great interest in prevent-
ing the process from being unnecessarily duplicated in a different forum.
On the other hand, there is a strong state interest in maintaining the
integrity of state antitrust law. particularly when state law creates
legitimate rights or remedies that federal law does not provide.
Keeping these values in mind, a federal district court examining a
removed, state filed claim in a concurrent filing situation should attempt
to answer one question objectively: must the plaintiff remain in state court
to obtain the relief sought, or does the federal court provide an equally
good forum?
In many such cases, a federal district court would be justified in holding
that the state claim is in reality an artfully pleaded federal complaint.24
In most instances, analysis reveals that even if the rights granted under
state law are different from those created under federal law, the state
law complaint could be appended to a federal complaint and both state
and federal issues could be litigated in the consolidated proceeding."l This
rule would apply even with respect to those states that allow indirect
purchasers damage actions. As noted above, federal law currently per-
mits an indirect purchaser to claim injunctive relief. 2 An indirect pur-
chaser seeking damages in a consolidated federal antitrust action may
circumvent this rule by filing a federal claim seeking an injunction and
appending a state law damages claim under the federal court's pendent
jurisdiction.243 Only in the relatively rare case where the plaintiff would
lose a legitimate state created right by being forced into the federal forum
should the plaintiff be permitted to keep his cause of action in state court.2 4
20 Whether this justifies removal under circumstances where the state court would not
have had subject matter jurisdiction, as would be the case with respect to a state filed
antitrust complaint, is a difficult question. See supra notes 214-16 and accompanying text.
Under the doctrine that removal jurisdiction is entirely derivative and that the federal
court acquires no jurisdiction by removal where the state court had no jurisdiction to begin
with, it would appear that the federal court's only alternative is to dismiss the complaint.
See Lambert Run Coal Co. v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 258 U.S. 377 (1922). In Salveson v.
Western States Bankcard Ass'n, 525 F. Supp. 566, 580 (N.D. Cal. 1981), the court held that
once a state antitrust claim filed in state court was removed and determined to be an
artfully pleaded federal claim, the only course of action available to the federal court was
dismissal "under the derivative jurisdiction doctrine:' The "derivative jurisdiction" rule
has been criticized with respect to federal question cases, because it produces "undesirable
results." 14 C. WRIGHT. A. MILLER & E. COOPER. supra note 178, at S 3722, at 574-76.
" In the Corrugated Container litigation, Three J Farms v. Plaintiffs' Steering Comm.,
659 F.2d 1332 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 1012 (1982), the state filing plaintiffs
were-also plaintiffs in the federal proceeding. As a part of the eventual negotiated settle-
ment in the multidistrict federal action, all such state claims were dropped. See supra notes
205-17 and accompanying text. Adams Extract Co. v. Chesapeake Co. of Va., 643 F.2d 196,
202-06 (5th Cir. 1981).
242 See cases cited supra note 202.
See supra notes 188-204 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Bruno v. Superior Court, 127 Cal. Ct. App. 3d 120, 179 Cal. Rptr. 343 (1981)
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In such a case, a cautious use of a federal injunction of the state court
proceedings, pending determination of the federal proceedings, might be
the best way to maintain the integrity of the multidistrict process and
the state antitrust scheme.
4 5
The Simultaneous Filing Problem:
Federal Injunction of State Judicial Proceedings
In a footnote to its opinion in the consolidated sugar antitrust litiga-
tion, the Ninth Circuit suggested that a federal injunction of simultaneous
state antitrust proceedings would be a more forthright solution to the
simultaneous filing problem than the federalizing and removal or dismissal
of state law complaints.24 The Fifth Circuit has recently taken that same
approach in the corrugated container antitrust litigation.247 However, the
use of a federal injunction against a state court in such circumstances
raises serious problems of federal-state relations.
In the Three J Farms"' case, the Fifth Circuit enjoined the state law
plaintiffs from pursuing "any claims relating to this class action in any
court other than the United States District Court in Texas."249 Use of
a federal injunction to prevent a plaintiff from filing a state law com-
plaint in order to avoid federal consolidation and transfer is a novel exer-
cise of the power of the federal court. Since 1793 the federal Anti-
Injunction Act' forbids federal courts from enjoining state proceedings
except in a narrow, strictly construed range of circumstances.
The Anti-Injunction Act permits a federal court to enjoin state pro-
ceedings only when it is "expressly" authorized to do so by an act of Con-
gress, when the state proceeding is itself a threat to the jurisdiction of
a federal court, or when an injunction is necessary to protect or give ef-
fect to a judgment of the federal court."' Whether any of these exceptions
to the anti-injunction provision will permit a federal injunction of state
proceedings in the simultaneous filing cases is a perplexing problem that
the courts have only begun to address.
(state law permits an antitrust plaintiff class to recover damages by fluid or by pres method).
For a discussion of the liberalized class action procedures permitted by California courts
see supra notes 193-204.
ZS See infra text accompanying notes 297-99.
Z3 California v. California and Hawaiian Sugar Co., 588 F.2d 1270, 1273 n.7 (9th Cir. 1978).
However, the Ninth Circuit has now decided that the Anti-Injunction Act forbids an in-
junction in such circumstances. Alton Box Board Co. v. Esprit de Corp., 682 F.2d 1267
(9th Cir. 1982).
"4 Three J Farms, Inc. v. Plaintiffs' Steering Comm., 659 F.2d 1332 (5th Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 456 U.S. 998 (1982).
248 Id.
29 Id. at 1333.
See 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1976).
22 Id.
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"Expressly Authorized by Act of Congress"
The Anti-Injunction Act permits a federal court to enjoin a state pro-
ceeding when a federal statute under which the federal court is hearing
the complaint "expressly" authorizes the injunction. 2 The Supreme Court
has interpreted this exception to mean that the injunction is permissible
when the federal statute at issue creates a "specific and uniquely federal
right or remedy" and enforcement of that right "could be frustrated if
the federal court were not empowered to enjoin a state court
proceeding."' In short, the "expressly authorized" exception to the Anti-
Injunction Act means that the federal injunction need only be implicitly
authorized. For example, in Mitchum v. Foster,2" the Supreme Court
unanimously held that 42 U.S.C. section 1983 was designed to protect
federal civil rights from state infringement and therefore empowered
federal courts to enjoin a state proceeding which might in and of itself
interfere with federally protected constitutional rights, even though
nothing in the language of section 1983 expressly provides for federal
injunctions of state judicial proceedings.'
In Vendo Co. v. Lektro-Vend Corp.,' a divided Supreme Court addressed
the question whether federal antitrust law might "expressly authorize"
an injunction of state proceedings that interfere with the protection of
a federally created right. That case involved a covenant suit by a promisee
against a promisor for breach of a covenant not to compete pursuant to
a sale of the promisor's business assets.' The promisee sued in state
court and won a judgment after protracted litigation. During that litiga-
tion the promisor filed its own suit in federal district court alleging that
the noncompetition covenant violated antitrust law.' That suit was
allowed to "lie 'dormant"' until the state supreme court affirmed the judg-
ment for the promisee. 9 At that time, the promisor petitioned the federal
court for an injunction against enforcement of the state judgment.2"
The facts of Vendo Co. did not present a particularly compelling case
for granting a federal injunction of state proceedings. In nine years of
state court litigation, the federal antitrust issues were never fully litigated
2' Id.
I Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 237-38 (1972); M. REDISH, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: TEN-
SIONS IN THE ALLOCATION OF JUDICIAL POWER 259 (1980).
407 U.S. 225 (1972).
See generally 17 C. WRIGHT. A. MILLER & E. COOPER, supra note 178, at S 4224, at 330.
433 U.S. 623 (1977).
Vendo Co., 433 U.S. at 626-27.
Id. at 627.
' Id. at 628. The judgment was affirmed by the state court not on the theory of breach
of the noncompetition covenants, but rather upon the theory that the promisor breached
a fiduciary duty owed to the promisee. Id. at 628 (citing Vendo Co. v. Stoner, 58 Ill. 2d
289, 321 N.E.2d 1 (1974)).
Vendo Co., 433 U.S. at 629.
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in the state courts. The defendant had interposed a federal antitrust
defense in the state proceeding based on the noncompetition covenants,
but then voluntarily withdrew it. 6'
In a three member plurality opinion, Justice Rehnquist found that the
provision for private injunctive relief in federal antitrust law262 did not
"expressly" create an exception to the Anti-Injunctive Act. Justice Rehn-
quist interpreted the Mitchum v. Foste? test as requiring for such an
exception (1) that the federal statute at issue create a "uniquely federal
right or remedy" and (2) that the statute "could be given its intended
scope only by the stay of a state court proceeding."
'2 4
Justice Rehnquist compared the legislative history of the antitrust laws
with that of section 1983. He concluded that when section 1983 was passed,
Congress had been particularly concerned with protecting federal rights
from state infringement, and that one way a state could violate federal
civil rights was through abusive state court litigation. In short, section
1983 was explicitly designed by Congress to alter the relationship be-
tween the states and the federal government and to prevent the state
itself from interfering with federal rights.6 5 Conversely, no one had sug-
gested that when Congress passed the federal antitrust laws it "was con-
cerned with the possibility that state-court proceedings would be used
to violate the Sherman or Clayton Acts."26
Justice Rehnquist's test dictates that if an exception to the Anti-
Injunction Act is not "expressly authorized" within a statute itself, the
statute's legislative history must at least show some expression of con-
cern by Congress that state proceedings could be used to deny enforce-
ment or protection of federally created rights. Since there was no such
evidence in the legislative history of the federal antitrust laws, such laws
did not in any instance authorize a federal court to enjoin state
proceedings.
In a concurring opinion joined by Chief Justice Burger, Justice Blackmun
took a different approach. He believed that section 16 of the Clayton Act
authorized a federal injunction of state proceedings, but only in those
circumstances when the state proceedings themselves were "being used
as an anticompetitive device" to violate the federal antitrust laws.267
Presumably, even though the framers of the Sherman and Clayton Acts
11 Id at 627-28 n.2. However, before the defendant withdrew the federal defense in state
court, the Illinois Appellate Court held that the district court erred in striking that defense.
Id. at 627-28 n.2 (citing Vendo Co. v. Stone, 13 Ill. App. 3d 291, 300 N.E.2d 632 (1973)).
15 U.S.C. S 26 (1976).
Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225 (1972). See sources cited supra note 253.
Vendo Co., 433 U.S. at 632.
Id. at 633.
Id. at 634.
Id. at 644 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (citing California Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking
Unltd., 404 U.S. 508 (1972)). See also Technician Medical Information Sys. Corp. v. Green
Bay Packaging, Inc., 480 F. Supp. 124 (E.D. Wis. 1979) R. BORK. supra note 168, at 347-64.
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did not contemplate that state court proceedings might be used to violate
the federal antitrust laws, if they had they would have agreed that the
state court proceedings could then be enjoined. In the case before the
Court, however, the state proceedings were not themselves a federal an-
titrust violation.
The four dissenters in Vendo268 agreed with the concurring opinion that
a federal injunction under the antitrust laws against a state proceeding
was authorized by Congress when the state proceeding was itself a viola-
tion of the federal antitrust laws."9 The dissenters disagreed with the
concurring justices, however, about the particular case before the Court.
They accepted a finding of fact by the district court that the plaintiffs
in the state case (the promisees under the noncompetition covenant) were
attempting to monopolize their market, and that judicial enforcement of
the noncompetition covenant was a mechanism for achieving monopoly
in violation of the federal antitrust laws."' The dissenters concluded that
the state litigation was used in this particular case as part of a plan to
monopolize illegally, and therefore, a federal injunction of the state judg-
ment was proper. '
Six members of the Supreme Court in Vendo concluded that there would
be some occasions when a federal injunction of state proceedings was "ex-
pressly authorized" under the federal antitrust laws." 2 However, all
members of the Court agreed that no such injunction would be permissi-
ble under the "expressly authorized" exception to the Anti-Injunction Act
unless the state litigation itself was anticompetitive activity in violation
of the federal antitrust laws. The simultaneous filing cases do not appear
to involve such a violation. In some instances the state filings may be
an attempt to subvert proper adjudication of federal antitrust claims,"'
but they cannot be reasonably interpreted as antitrust violations
themselves. Thus, a federal injunction of state proceedings in the
simultaneous filing cases would be improper if it were based on the theory
that the antitrust laws create an "expressly authorized" exception to the
Anti-Injunction Act. 4
Justices Stevens, Brennan, White and Marshall.
Vendo Co., 433 U.S. at 654 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
270 Id. at 646 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
2" Id. at 654 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Likewise, it would appear that the same six members of the Court agreed that the
absence of legislative history indicating any express concern by Congress that state judicial
proceedings could violate a particular statute should not preclude a federal injunction of
state judicial proceedings when such proceedings are in fact used to violate federal statute.
See generally Redish, supra note 253, at 275.
s See supra notes 180-99 and accompanying text.
' See Kurek v. Pleasure Driveway and Park Dist. of Peoria, Ill., 574 F.2d 892 (7th Cir.
1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1090 (1979) (federal court having jurisdiction over antitrust
claim could not enjoin federal antitrust defendant from enforcing state court judgment
even if state claim were itself an attempt by the state plaintiff to violate antitrust law).
The court interpreted Vendo Co. v. Lektro-Vend Corp., 433 U.S. 623 (1977) as creating
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"Where Necessary in Aid of Its Jurisdiction, or to
Protect or Effectuate Its Judgments"
Even if a federal injunction of state proceedings is not "expressly
authorized" in a particular federal statute, the federal court may never-
theless enjoin state proceedings if the injunction is necessary (1) in aid
of the jurisdiction of the federal court, or (2) necessary to protect or give
effect to a federal court judgment. The second of these two exceptions
is relevant only after a final judgment has been entered by a federal court
and after state litigation has been commenced that would frustrate or
interfere with that judgement. 5
The facts of the Three J Farms case 8 in the Corrugated Container litiga-
tion support a principled argument in favor of a federal injunction against
state proceedings. The plaintiffs filed an action under the South Carolina
antitrust statute while fifty federal antitrust actions arising out of the
same operative facts had previously been consolidated. The same plain-
tiffs, represented by the same counsel, were also parties in the con-
solidated federal proceedings. The multidistrict court enjoined the plain-
tiffs from pursuing their state lawsuit, and the Fifth Circuit affirmed,
holding that the injunction was justified because the state proceedings
would challenge the jurisdiction of the federal court." Additionally, since
a class action agreement had already been approved by the district court,
the Fifth Circuit held that the state proceedings would interfere with
the federal court's ability to effectuate its judgmentsY8
an "expressly authorized" exception to the federal antitrust laws only if the state claims
were "baseless and repetitive," and were filed in order to violate the federal antitrust
laws. This is consistent with established doctrine that "a pattern of baseless, repetitive
claims" in state court may themselves constitute an antitrust violation. See California Motor
Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508 (1972).
, See cases and sources cited infra notes 280-86 and accompanying text.
26 Three J Farms, Inc. v. Plaintiffs' Steering Comm., 659 F.2d 1332 (5th Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 456 U.S. 998 (1982).
Three J Farms, 659 F.2d at 1334.
, Id. at 1334-35. The Fifth Circuit held that once the court in the consolidated Cor-
rugated Container litigation had approved a settlement agreement between the parties,
but before it had entered judgment making the settlement agreement itself a final judg-
ment, the issuance of the injunction against the simultaneous state proceedings was pro-
per. In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litigation (Three JFarms), 659 F.2d 1332, 1335
(5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 1012 (1982). The settlement agreement itself, as subse-
quently approved in part by the Fifth Circuit, provided for the release of state law claims
pending in the South Carolina courts. See In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litigation
(Adams Extract Co. v. Chesapeake Corp.), 643 F.2d 196, 222 (5th Cir. 1981). The Fifth Cir-
cuit observed that the South Carolina state plaintiffs were themselves members of the
plaintiff class in the federal multidistrict litigation and that they had an adequate oppor-
tunity to "opt out of the class and litigate their state claims in state court." Id. at 222.
Furthermore, the state law plaintiffs knew that the settlement being negotiated was likely
to compromise the state law claims before they were asked to opt out. The Fifth Circuit
concluded that the state law plaintiffs nevertheless wanted "to participate in the [federal]
class, share in the fruits of the class settlement negotiations, and still be free to litigate
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Because the Fifth Circuit rested its approval of the federal injunction
of state proceedings on the theory that a class action settlement was a
judgment that could be protected by federal injunction, the Fifth Circuit
did not fully consider the more difficult question: should the mere fact
that there is an ongoing multidistrict federal antitrust litigation be suffi-
cient to support an injunction by the transferee federal court of any state
proceeding arising out of the same operative facts? The doctrine that a
federal court can "protect its jurisdiction" by enjoining parallel state pro-
ceedings has been construed narrowly. As Justice Rehnquist observed
in Vendo, the Supreme Court has "never viewed parallel in personam ac-
tions as interfering with the jurisdiction of either court." 9 It is very dif-
ficult to carve an exception out of the Anti-Injunction Act that complex
federal litigation, which has been consolidated into a single district, should
be treated any differently.
The provision of the Anti-Injunction Act permitting an injunction when
necessary in aid of the jurisdiction of the federal court is most generally
applied when a federal proceeding in rem is underway, and a state court
subsequently attempts to attach the same res in a parallel proceeding.'
Although there are some instances of a federal injunction of state pro-
ceedings under this exception when both proceedings are in personam,"'
the general rule is to the contrary.282 It does not matter that a state judg-
ment will have collateral estoppel effect with respect to any subsequent
their state claims. In short, the objectors felt entitled to the bird in the hand while pursu-
ing the flock in the bush." Id.
Under these circumstances, where the federal court has approved a settlement that will
be entered as a final judgment, where one of the provisions of that judgment is the release
of state law claims, and where the state law claims are being asserted by persons who
themselves are parties in the multidistrict federal litigation, then the use of a federal in-junction by the multidistrict court to stay the state proceedings appears to be an absolutely
reasonable and necessary mechanism by which the federal court can effectuate its judgment.
One problem with the use of an injunction to effectuate the judgment of a federal court
under the circumstances of the Corrugated Container litigation is the requirement that
before a federal court can enjoin state litigation on the grounds that the injunction is
necessary to protect or effectuate the federal court judgment, the issues covered by the
federal judgment must be "fully and finally adjudicated" by the federal court. See Lamb
Enter., Inc. v. Kiroff, 549 F2d 1052 (6th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 431 US. 968 (1977) (quoting
International Assoc. of Machinists and Aerospace Workers v. Nix, 512 F.2d 125, 130 (5th
Cir. 1975). In the Corrugated Container case, the judgment sought to be protected by the
injunction was a negotiated settlement agreement. However, the close scrutiny given by
the district and the circuit courts to this agreement and to federal class action settlement
agreements in general, should remove any doubt that this was a "fully and finally ad-judicated" judgment of a federal court. See, e.g., Corrugated Container Antitrust Litig., 643
F.2d 195 (5th Cir. 1981) (detailed analysis of settlement agreement). See generally 17 C.
WRIGHT. A. MILLER & E. COOPER, supra note 178, at S 422.
Vendo Co. v. Lektro-Vend Corp., 433 U.S. 623, 642 (1977) (emphasis in original).
See generally 17 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER. supra note 178, at S 4225 n.3.
2" See generally id. at § 4225 n.7.
See Vendo Co., 433 U.S. at 641-42; Carter v. Ogden Corp., 524 F.2d 74, 76 (5th Cir.
1957). For criticism of the general rule see M. REDISH, supra note 253, at 285-90.
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federal judgment.' Nor does it make a difference that the question in
the state proceeding arises under federal law;' indeed, it appears that
a federal injunction is improper even when the state court has no jurisdic-
tion over the matter because the case is within the exclusive jurisdiction
of the federal court." There is simply no precedent supporting the propo-
sition that a federal court can "protect its jurisdiction" by enjoining a
parallel state proceeding when the proceeding is in personam and seeks
to enforce a legitimate state remedy permitted by Congress."
The Federal Injunction and the Multidistrict Court
When the Fifth Circuit recently affirmed the multidistrict federal court's
injunction of the state proceedings in the Corrugated Container case,28
the court did not acknowledge the equivocal Supreme Court precedent
in Vendo.21 The Fifth Circuit instead considered the propriety of the
federal injunction against the state proceeding under the two different
standards: (1) whether the injunction was necessary in aid of the federal
court's jurisdiction;2 9 and (2) whether it was necessary to effectuate the
judgment of a federal court.'
One possibility that the Fifth Circuit did not consider-perhaps because
there is no precedent for doing so -is that the federal multidistrict litiga-
tion statute29 1 itself might "expressly authorize" a federal injunction of
state proceedings in certain circumstances.' Of course, a rule that anytime
I See Vernitron Corp. v. Benjamin, 440 F.2d 105 (2nd Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 402 U.S.
987 (1971); Essex Systems Co. v. Steinberg, 335 F. Supp. 298 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), aff]d, 447 F.2d
1405 (2nd Cir. 1971).
1 Atlantic Coast Line R.R. Co. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng'rs, 398 U.S. 281, 295-96
(1970); Vernitron Corp. v. Benjamin, 440 F.2d 105 (2nd Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 402 U.S.
87 (1971).
2 Amalgamated Clothing Workers of Am. v. Richman Bros., 348 U.S. 511 (1955). But
cf. Capital Serv. Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 347 U.S. 501 (1954) (N.L.R.B, not private party seeking
injunction).
"I It would therefore appear that a finding by a federal court that a separate state-court
antitrust filing was really an "artfully pleaded" federal complaint would not of itself justify
a federal injunction against the state court proceedings. See supra text accompanying notes
225-38.
I" Three J Farms, Inc. v. Plaintiffs' Steering Comm., 659 F.2d 1332 (5th Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 456 U.S. 998 (1982).
Vendo Co. v. Lektro-Vend Corp., 433 U.S. 623 (1977). See supra notes 256-74 and ac-
companying text.
Three J Farms, 659 F.2d at 1334-35.
Id. at 1335.
28 U.S.C. § 1407 (1976).
One initial problem in determining that 28 U.S.C. S 1407 (1976) authorizes a federal
injunction of state court proceedings is that the language of S 1407 nowhere provides for
any injunction of any kind. As a general rule, when the court considers whether or not
a federal statute "expressly authorizes" a federal court injunction of state proceedings,
the federal statute at issue itself contains a provision permitting injunctive relief, and it
is that particular provision that is at issue in the case. Thus, for example, the precise holding
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several federal claims have -been consolidated and transferred the
transferee court may enjoin simultaneous state proceedings based on the
same facts would thwart the policy behind the Anti-Injunction Act.
However, the facts of some of the simultaneous state antitrust suits make
a compelling argument that sometimes such a federal injunction is
desirable.
For example, the state complaint in the Corrugated Container litiga-
tion can be characterized as nothing more than an attempt to coerce the
defendant to settle by forcing it to engage in very expensive identical
litigation in two forums. 9 The gist of the state complaint was identical
to the one filed in the multidistrict proceeding; indeed, the plaintiffs copied
large parts of the complaint verbatim. The plaintiffs sought relief in the
state action which could have been obtained under federal law or that
could have been joined as a pendant claim in the federal action. 4 In this
particular case the plaintiffs went to great lengths to avoid the federal
forum and even attempted to prevent diversity removal by joining an
improper party as plaintiff.9 '
If it is clear that a plaintiff is seeking relief under state law which can
be granted only by a state court, then any attempt by the federal court
to federalize the state complaint and remove it or otherwise interfere
with the plaintiffs action runs contrary to the principles of federalism
embodied in the two-tier, federal-state antitrust enforcement scheme and
the Anti-Injunction Act. On the other hand, if the plaintiff could obtain
all the relief it is entitled to in the consolidated federal proceeding, in-
cluding full consideration of the state law claim, then the plaintiffs state
claim can be characterized as an effort to defeat the policy behind 28
U.S.C. section 1407 of avoiding duplicative litigation. Where those criteria
are met, an injunction from the federal transferee court would be good
policy, and arguably would fall within an exception to the Anti-Injunction
Act."
in Vendo Co. v. Lektro-Vend Corp., 433 U.S. 623 (1977), is that § 16 of the Clayton Act
(15 U.S.C. S 26 (1976)), which permits private plaintiffs to have injunctive relief against
antitrust violations, did not "expressly authorize" a federal injunction against state pro-
ceedings under the circumstances of that case. Nevertheless, federal injunctions issued
under federal statutes that contain no express provision for injunctive relief are a common
occurrence, and the power of a federal court to issue an injunction in a federal question
case rests not merely on statutory authorization but on centuries-old principles of equity.
See Hecht Co. v. Bowles,. 321 U.S. 321, 329 (1944); 11 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER,
supra note 178, at-S 2942. At least one federal circuit court has held that a federal statute
that makes no provision for private injunctive relief nevertheless "expressly authorizes"
an injunction against state proceedings, where continuation of the state proceedings might
violate the policy of the federal statute. Stockslager v. Carroll Elec. Coop. Corp., 528 F.2d
949 (8th Cir. 1976) (holding that the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C.
5 4332 (1976) authorizes a federal injunction of state proceedings).
See Three J Farms, Inc. v. Alton Box Bd. Co., 1979-1 Trade Cas. (CCH} 62,423 (D.S.C.
1978), rev'd, 609 F.2d 112 (4th Cir. 1979).
294 Id.
Id. at 76,551.
See Stockslager v. Carroll Elec. Coop. Corp., 528 F.2d 949, 951 (8th Cir. 1976).
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When Should a Federal Court Enjoin State Antitrust Proceedings?
The policy of federalism contained in the Anti-Injunction Act"7 dictates.
that federal courts should rarely halt state judicial proceedings. An
understanding of the proper relationship between federal and state anti-
trust law can be a guide in determining when the federal court should
step aside. As a basic premise, states are entitled to have their own anti-
trust laws, even when they are different from federal law in their scope
or application. It necessarily follows that plaintiffs must be permitted to
take advantage of those differences or else the state law becomes im-
potent. On the other hand, simultaneous filing of state antitrust claims
when federal multidistrict litigation is ongoing imposes difficult burdens
on both court systems and the antitrust litigants. The transferor court's
decision to enjoin a particular state proceeding must rest on its deter-
mination whether a particular state claim is principled or brought for
the purpose of harrassment.
That determination rests on the answer to a single question: could the
plaintiff obtain the relief it is seeking in the federal multidistrict litiga-
tion? In most instances the answer will be yes." 8 State antitrust law is
often identical to federal antitrust law. Furthermore, when state law is
different, the plaintiff will generally be able to bring both a federal and
a state claim into the federal court under the court's pendent jurisdic-
tion. When the plaintiff has the option of filing in federal court, a federal
injunction of state proceedings could be used to force the plaintiff to ex-
ercise that option.
There are some instances, however, where the state law or a state pro-
cedural rule will entitle the plaintiff to a kind of relief unavailable in
federal court; the liberalized California procedural rules for class actions
provide an example. 9 In such instances, a federal injunction enjoining
the state proceedings would subvert the fundamental policies behind the
rule permitting state antitrust laws in the federal system.
What Will the Federal Injunction of State Proceedings Accomplish?
In simultaneous filing cases such as the Corrugated Container0 litiga-
tion, a federal injunction enjoining the state proceedings would in effect
force the plaintiff to bring all of its claims into the federal court. Once
a federal judgment had been entered, claim preclusion would bar not only
all claims actually litigated in the federal proceedings, but all which could
28 U.S.C. 5 2283 (1978).
"' See supra notes 193-96 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 193-204 and accompanying text.
=' Three J Farms v. Plaintiffs' Steering Comm., 659 F.2d 1332 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied,
456 U.S. 998 (1982). See supra notes 205-18 and accompanying text.
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have been litigated."0 ' Since the plaintiff could have attached its state law
claims to the federal claim under the federal court's pendent jurisdiction,
the state law claim would be barred. 2 If a plaintiff attempted to raise
a state law claim under such circumstances, the federal court which issued
the earlier judgment could permanently enjoin the new action under the
exception to the Anti-Injunction Act permitting state proceedings to be
enjoined where necessary to protect or effectuate its judgments."0
The situation is more complex when the state-filing plaintiff is not a
party in the federal multidistrict litigation. One probable effect of the
injunction, of course, is that the federal litigation will proceed to judg-
ment but the state litigation will not. It is therefore important to deter-
mine the effect of a federal antitrust judgment as against a plaintiff in
a state antitrust case arising out of the same operative facts, but who
was not a party in the federal proceeding from which the judgment issued.
Two issues must be considered: (1) the collateral estoppel or issue preclu-
sion effect of a federal antitrust judgment against subsequent proceedings
in state court under state law; and (2) the circumstances under which
the doctrine of offensive collateral estoppel would permit a state antitrust
plaintiff to rely on a prior federal antitrust judgment adverse to the
defendant.
It is relatively clear today that the general policies against relitigation
of the same claims or issues apply as between federal and state antitrust
claims. First, although the two bodies of law are created by different
sovereigns, as a general matter with respect to a particular claim they
create the same "cause of action." For example, in Nash County Board
of Education v. Biltmore Co.,'4 the Fourth Circuit held that a consent
30 See Federated Dept. Stores, Inc. v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394, 404 (1981) (Blackmun, J., con-
curring); Commissioner v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591, 597 (1948); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
JUDGMENTS S 61.1 (Tent. Draft No. 5, 1978).
The doctrine of claim preclusion would apply not only to the same party in the federal
and state antitrust claims, but also to anyone adjudged to be in "privity" with that party.
See Nash County Bd. of Educ. v. Biltmore Co., 640 F.2d 484 (4th Cir. 1981). Although the
concept of privity in the res judicata context is elusive, the term generally refers to "a
person so identified in interest with a party to former litigation that he represents precisely
the same legal right in respect to the subject matter involved:' Jefferson School of Social
Science v. Subversive Act. Community Bd., 331 F.2d 76, 83 (D.C. Cir. 1963). An interesting
question is whether or not a person who opts out of a federal class action can in any cir-
cumstances be considered to be in privity with those who remain to litigate the claim.
As a general rule, this is not the case. A person who opts out of a rule 23(b)(3) class action
is free to litigate his or her own claim even though the class action proceeded to judgment.
But see Note, Offensive Assertion of Collateral Estoppel By Persons Opting Out of a Class
Action, 31 HASTINGS L.J. 1189, 1207 n.105 (1980) (argument advocating privity). For a discus-
sion of preclusion, see generally 18 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, supra note 178, at
SS 448-62.
See Browning Debenture Holders' Comm. v. DASA Corp., 605 F.2d 35 (2nd Cir. 1978);
Donelon v. New Orleans Terminal Co., 474 F.2d 1108 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S.
855 (1973); Walter E. Heller & Co. v. Cox, 379 F. Supp. 299 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
3' 640 F.2d 484 (4th Cir. 1981).
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decree under state antitrust law was res judicata as to a subsequent
federal proceeding because the two claims, although based on different
bodies of statutory law, were really the same "cause of action."30 In the
converse situation, where the federal judgment precedes the state claim,
the same result is reached."
When the state plaintiff is not a party in the federal action, claim pre-
clusion will not normally bar the state proceedings unless the state plain-
tiff is found to be in privity with a party in the earlier federal action."'
However, issue preclusion, or collateral estoppel, permits a certain amount
of nonmutuality so that it can be applied in favor of persons who were
not parties in the earlier proceeding."8
Issue preclusion generally has a broader application to federal and state
actions than claim preclusion. Although the federal and state "causes of
action" of the plaintiff may be somewhat different, the doctrine of col-
Nash County Bd. of Educ., 640 F.2d at 488.
The two suits allege the same wrongful act, the same illegal price-fixing con-
spiracy, the same operative facts in support of such conspiracy. The state and
federal statutes upon which the two actions are based are identical in language
except in the requirement of the federal statute, but not of the state statute,
of a showing of interstate commerce. In both cases, the evidence will be iden-
tical and the damages recoverable and the relief available the same.
Id. at 488. In cases where the state antitrust law and the federal antitrust law are substan-
tively different the claim preclusion effect is generally weaker. For example, one court
has held that if the first action was brought in a state court under a statute that did not
authorize recovery of treble damages, then the state judgment will not necessarily be
preclusive of a later claim under the federal antitrust laws. See Hayes v. Solomon, 597
F.2d 958, 984 (5th Cir. 1979), holding that the principle of claim preclusion (res judicata)
must be limited to claims "capable of recovery" in the former action. See also Cream Top
Creamery v. Dean Milk Co., 383 F.2d 358,363 (6th Cir. 1967); see also Marrese v. American
Academy of Orthopedic Surgeons, 524 F. Supp. 389 (N.D. Ill. -1981) (distinguishing Nash,
supra, because the earlier state filing was not under state antitrust law but under the
common law of unfair business practices). See Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Automotive Ser-
vice Councils of Del., 1981-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 63,958 (D. Del. 1981); but see Harper Plastics,
Inc. v. Amoco Chemicals Corp., 657 F.2d 939 (7th Cir. 1981). See generally Note, The Res
Judicata Effect of Prior State Court Judgments in Sherman Act Suits: Exalting Substance
Over Form, 51 FORDHAM L. REV. 1374 (1983).
1 See Bocardo v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 184 Cal. Rptr. 903 (1982) (holding that dismissal
in a federal antitrust action because the plaintiffs were indirect purchasers precluded the
plaintiffs from bringing an indirect purchaser action under California state antitrust law,
because the action could have been brought as a pendent claim to the earlier federal ac-
tion); Woods Exploration & Producing Co. v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 438 F.2d 1286 (5th
Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1047 (1972) (judgment adverse to plaintiffs in federal anti-
trust case was res judicata to an action brought in state court under the Texas antitrust
law and therefore fell within the exception to the Anti-Injunction Act permitting a federal
court to enjoin such proceedings where necessary to protect or effectuate its judgment);
Federated Dept. Stores, Inc. v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394, 404 (1981) (Blackmun, J., concurring);
Harper Plastics, Inc. v. Amoco Chem. Corp., 657 F.2d 939, 947 (7th Cir. 1981); Belliston
v. Texaco, 521 P.2d 379, 382 (Utah, 1974); Ford Motor Co. v. Superior Ct., 35 Cal. App.
3d 676, 680, 110 Cal. Rptr. 59, 61-62 (1973); McCann v. Whitney, 25 N.Y.S.2d 354, 357 (1940);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 61.1, reporter's note, comment e, illustration 10 (Tent.
Draft No. 5, 1978).
See supra note 302.
See generally 18 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER. supra note 178, at § 4463-65.
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lateral estoppel would bar the relitigation in state court of an issue ac-
tually litigated in the federal proceeding and necessary to the federal
court judgment.
The provision of the Anti-Injunction Act permitting a federal court to
enjoin a state proceeding in order to protect or effectuate a federal judg-
ment applies as much to issue preclusion as it does to claim preclusion.
A federal court could permanently enjoin state court relitigation of an
issue that was previously litigated in federal court, if the party seeking
relitigation had been a party in the earlier action and if the issue had
been decided against that party's interests."9
On the other hand, the due process clause generally requires that a
person not a party in the first action cannot be collaterally estopped in
the second action with respect to a determination made contrary to its
interest in the first action. For example, if a federal multidistrict litiga-
tion eventuated in a federal judgment adverse to the plaintiffs, as a basic
principle a non-party in that proceeding would not be bound by the judg-
ment if it were a plaintiff in subsequent state proceedings. 10
An interesting question is the appropriateness of a state plaintiffs use
of "offensive" collateral estoppel3 1 when an earlier federal judgment has
been rendered adverse to the same defendants. Although the full faith
and credit clause of the U.S. Constitution does not by its own terms re-
quire a state court to honor a federal court's judgment,"2 courts consider-
ing the question have uniformly held that state courts are so bound, upon
a' variety of theories." Additionally, with respect to federal question cases,
it seems relatively clear today that federal law governs the applicability
of issue preclusion when the first judgment is in federal court and the
second proceeding is in state court.
314
I See Bank of Heflin v. Miles, 621 F.2d 108 (5th Cir. 1980); Samuel C. Ennis & Co. v.
Woodmar Realty Co., 542 F.2d 45 (7th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1096 (1976); Johnson
v. Radford, 449 F.2d 115 (5th Cir. 1971); McCubbrey v. Boise Cascade Home & Land Corp.,
71 F.R.D. 62 (N.D. Cal. 1976).
310 Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 110, 110 (1969); however, the
rule has been eroded somewhat in recent years. See generally 18 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER
& E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE S 449 (1981); See Pielemeier, Due Process
Limitations on the Application of Collateral Estoppel Against Nonparties to Prior Litiga-
tion, 63 B.U.L. REV. 383 (1983). Note, Preclusion ofAbsent Disputants to Compel Intervention,
79 COLUM. L. REV. 1551 (1979).
31 Many commentators today use instead the terms "nonmutual estoppel" or "nonmutual
issue preclusion." However, those terms apply generally to two quite different sets of cir-
cumstances: (1) where a plaintiff not a party to the former litigation is seeking to preclude
relitigation of an issue determined adversely to a defendant who is a party in both cases;
(2) where a defendant not a party to the former litigation is seeking to preclude relitiga-
tion of an issue determined adversely to a plaintiff who is a party in both cases. The term
"offensive collateral estoppel" refers to only the first instance.
... See Degnan, Federalized Res Judicata, 85 YALE L.J. 741 (1976).
I3 See, e.g., Levy v. Cohen, 19 Cal. 3d 165, 173, 137 Cal. Rptr. 162, 167 (1977). Younger
v. Jensen, 26 Cal. 3d 397, 411, 161 Cal. Rptr. 905, 914 (1980). See generally 18 C. WRIGHT,
A. MILLER & E. COOPER. supra note 178, at S 4468.
I" See Deposit Bank v. Frankfort, 191 U.S. 499 (1903); Stoll v. Gottlieb, 305 U.S. 165 (1938);
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The applicability of a federal standard is uncertain, however, when the
federal judgment is itself decided under state law.31 5 It is especially unclear
when the federal judgment is decided under a federal statute and the
subsequent state proceeding is brought under a state statute that is similar
to the federal statute, as would be the case in separately filed antitrust
cases." ' As a basic premise, a state court is the best interpreter of its
own state antitrust statutes. The question whether a particular state law
issue has been precluded by an earlier determination made in federal court
under federal law should present the state court with an opportunity to
interpret its own law.
In R.E. Spriggs Co. v. Adolph Coors Co.,317 the California Court of Ap-
peal held that a federal consent decree obtained by the Federal Trade
Commission under the federal antitrust laws could be used offensively
by a private plaintiff in a later action filed under state law. The court
suggested that the conclusions of law made in the earlier federal pro-
ceeding would not necessarily be preclusive in the subsequent state pro-
ceeding because the substantive law of the two jurisdictions might not
be identical."8 However, the plaintiffs could use collateral estoppel offen-
sively when an identical issue of fact litigated and judicially determined
in the previous federal action was also raised in the subsequent state
action.1 9
Such a use of offensive collateral estoppel is certainly consistent with
the general principles of minimizing duplicate litigation. It is unclear,
however, whether the state court is obligated, as a matter of federal law,
to give offensive collateral estoppel effect to a prior federal fact-finding
under such circumstances, or whether that question is entirely one of
state law.
The question may not be all that important. In fact, the decision whether
to permit offensive collateral estoppel is left to the discretion of the judge.
Even under the federal standard, there are many cases where the judge
could go either way. Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore320 is the Supreme
Court's most elaborate attempt recently to delineate the circumstances
under which offensive collateral estoppel is appropriate in federal actions.
Parklane involved a shareholder's derivative suit that alleged, in part,
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 87 (1980); 18 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, supra
note 178, at § 4468 n.27.
115 For an account of some of the confusion, see C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER. supra
note 178, at § 4472, and Degnan, supra note 312, where Professor Degnan argues that in
all such cases the effects of res judicata and collateral estoppel should be determined under
the law of the court that issued the first judgment.
I See, e.g., R. E. Spriggs Co. v. Adolph Coors Co., 94 Cal. App. 3d 419, 156 Cal. Rptr.
738 (1979). See supra text accompanying notes 120-25.
Adolph Coors, 94 Cal. App. 3d 419, 156 Cal. Rptr. 738 (1979).8, 94 Cal. App. 3d at 429, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 743.
39U Id.
S439 U.S. 322 (1979).
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that the defendant had produced a false and misleading proxy statement.
While the private shareholders' suit was pending, the SEC brought a suit
for an injunction and obtained a judgment that established that the proxy
statement was in fact false and misleading., Thereafter, the private plain-
tiffs moved for summary judgment, alleging that the determinations con-
tained in the SEC judgment were dispositive of their own lawsuit.'
In holding that offensive collateral estoppel was appropriate in this cir-
cumstance, the Supreme Court established four criteria that the federal
courts should use in deciding whether to permit offensive collateral estop-
pel: (1) whether the plaintiff seeking to use collateral estoppel in the sec-
ond action could have joined in the earlier action -if it could have, then
to permit it to use collateral estoppel offensively would encourage rather
than discourage duplicative litigation;324 (2) whether the defendant could
have foreseen the use of offensive collateral estoppel in a later action
and therefore would have had the incentive to litigate the former action
"fully and vigorously; '32 (3) whether "the judgment relied upon as a basis
for the estoppel is itself inconsistent with one or more previous judgments
in favor of the defendant;""3 8 and (4) whether the second action affords
the defendant procedural opportunities that were not available in the first
action and that might "readily cause a different result."' 3 7
The Supreme Court made it clear that "the preferable approach for
dealing with these problems in the federal courts is not to preclude the
use of collateral estoppel, but to grant trial courts broad discretion to
determine when it is to be applied." '328 These criteria are not constitu-
tionally or statutorily mandated, and there is nothing in the Supreme
Court's opinion to suggest that a state court is bound by them.
Parklane suggests that a state antitrust plaintiff should not have the
benefit of offensive collateral estoppel if it could have been a party-plaintiff
in the earlier federal litigation but chose not to participate, either by fail-
ing to file a claim,' or by opting-out of a rule 23(b)(3) class action."0 To
31 Parkane Hosiery, 439 U.S. at 324.
Id. at 324-25.
s Id. at 325.
' Id. at 331.
Id. at 332.
" Id. at 330.
Id. at 331.
Id.
u
9 Id.
m See generally Note, Offensive Assertion of Collateral Estoppel by Persons Opting Out
of a Class Action, 31 HASTINGS L.J. 1189 (1980). In GAF Corp. v. Eastman Kodak Co., [July-
Dec.] ANTITRUST TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 1027, at F-1 (Aug. 3, 1981), cert. denied, 444 U.S.
1093 (1980), the district court held that GAF could take advantage of offensive collateral
estoppel with respect to prior determinations made against Kodak in a lawsuit brought
by Berkey Photo Co., although theoretically it could have been a party in the prior action.
During pretrial procedures in the Berkey Photo case, GAF filed its own lawsuit against
Kodak based largely on the same operative facts. Both actions were assigned to the same
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permit a plaintiff to assert collateral estoppel offensively under such cir-
cumstances would thwart the basic policy against duplicative litigation.
However, it is not clear that a state court is bound by the rules that
the Supreme Court has imposed upon the federal court system." 1
CONCLUSION
State antitrust law exists largely at the pleasure of Congress. The
framers of the Sherman Act clearly intended to preserve state antitrust
enforcement. However, their perception of the limits of state and federal
power were so different from our perception today that it is no longer
meaningful to speak about the intent of the Fifty-First Congress. In 1890,
state and federal antitrust law was perceived as operating in mutually
exclusive arenas. Today, however, the jurisdictional boundaries of state
and federal antitrust are almost concurrent.
States now have the power to condemn antitrust violations that occur
anywhere in the nation, provided that there are sufficient harmful ef-
fects within the state itself. The commerce clause of the United States
Constitution is not a substantial barrier to the application of a state's
antitrust law to activities occurring outside the state. The Supreme Court
has insisted upon upholding state antitrust laws under the dormant com-
merce clause by holding as a general matter that such laws do not in-
terfere with the interstate flow of goods and do not discriminate against
interstate commerce. At the same time, the courts refuse to find state
antitrust laws preempted by federal antitrust law, unless the conflict is
so sharp that compliance with the state law would require violation of
the federal law. Even in that instance, the "state action" exemption from
the federal antitrust laws might permit enforcement of the state law.
judge and the proceedings were "coordinated to some degree." Id. at F-1. Both plaintiffs
wanted separate trials but the defendant sought a consolidated trial. Id. at F-5. The judge's
decision to grant separate trials was based on a determination that the GAF case would
be larger and more complex; that the Berkey case was at a more advanced stage and would
be ready for trial earlier; that there were counterclaims against Berkey but none against
GAF. Id. at F-5. Finally, the defendant had insisted on a jury trial and a combined trial
would have rendered the case very complex. Id. at F-5. Under these circumstances, the
southern district of New York ruled that GAF was not a party who could easily have join-
ed in the earlier trial; therefore, GAF could assert offensive collateral estoppel with respect
to issues determined against Kodak in the earlier Berkey trial. Id. at F-5. GAF was "not
the 'wait and see' plaintiff contemplated by Parklane Hosiery." Id. at F-5.
"I A certain amount of discretion in state court judges is in order. After all, it is the
burden on their own court system and not on the federal courts that they are concerned
with. For example, if the plaintiff can obtain the relief it wants only by going into state
court, as in the case of a Cartwright Act class action plaintiff seeking fluid recovery, then
the plaintiff should not be denied the benefit of collateral estoppel for failing to join the
federal proceeding. To do so would deprive the plaintiff of the opportunity to seek the
relief that the state law grants. In such a situation it would be quite appropriate to hold
that the state plaintiff could not have joined the federal proceeding, and therefore should
be permitted to use collateral estoppel offensively in the subsequent state proceeding.
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Similarly, under the choice-of-law analysis currently applied by the
United States Supreme Court, a state could apply its law to an out-of-
state transaction almost any time it could obtain personal jurisdiction over
the defendant. As a result, the domestic jurisdictional reach of state anti-
trust law is as great as the reach of federal antitrust law. Furthermore,
state law generally does not provide defendants with the same venue
protection that federal law does. If a state court can obtain personal
jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant, state law generally creates
at least one permissible venue within the state. As a matter of policy,
extraterritorial application of state antitrust law ought to be limited to
those instances when the state court has specific personal jurisdiction
over the defendant or when the cause of action arises out of the defen-
dant's activities within the forum state.
Aggressive application of state antitrust law on a nationwide scale can
play havoc with the two-tier, federal-state antitrust enforcement scheme,
particularly when the federal and state laws are inconsistent or provide
different remedies. This tension exists today with respect to those states
have have given indirect purchasers a damage action contrary to federal
law. The combined application of federal and state antitrust laws against
the same defendant may require the defendant to pay treble damages
twice for the same injury.
State antitrust law also interferes with the federal antitrust enforce-
ment scheme when state law is used to defeat the federal policy mini-
mizing duplicative litigation by consolidation and transfer of multi-party
claims. So far, the federal courts have had difficulty in dealing with
separate state actions filed simultaneously with consolidated federal litiga-
tion. In some instances, the federal courts have held that a separate state
filing is really an artfully pleaded federal complaint, and have ordered
removal. In one instance, a federal court has enjoined the simultaneous
state procedding. Both of these practices represent novel and questionable
exercises of federal judicial power, particularly if they are not carefully
limited. Before interfering with state proceedings, a federal court should
consider why the state-law plaintiff is in state court in the first place.
If the plaintiff filed in state court in order to obtain a remedy unavailable
in federal court, then the federal judge has no choice but to permit the
state litigation to continue. However, if the plaintiff could have obtained
the same relief in federal court, then the federal judge can infer that the
plaintiff is attempting to put unwarranted pressure on the defendant. In
such cases removal or an injunction of state court proceedings might be
appropriate. In all instances, however, the federal court must recognize
that states are entitled to their own antitrust laws, even when different
from federal law. Only that premise will protect the integrity of state
antitrust law.
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